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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (WEST GERMAN) & ITS ACTION GROUP HITLER WELLE.

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NPD

Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)

Combined Deutsche Rechtspartei, Deutsche Reichspartei, the split off Sozialistiche Reichspartei and the Deutsche Partei.

In August 1964 von Thaden arranged a meeting with other right-wingers to promote unification of all nationalist forces. Friedrich Thielen served as both front man and financial backer. A committee of 10 drafted a constitution which was accepted in November 1964 by representatives of the DRP, DP, GDP and the DVNP (Deutsche-National Volkspartei). The DRP officially disolved in December 1965 although the NPD had, in fact, long been the nationalist party. At the 21 March 1967 meeting of the NPD Executive Committee, the more moderate Thielen (former Deutsche Partei) was ousted from the NPD by the more extreme von Thaden forces (DRP).. There was no major rush to leave the NPD, however. Recent reporting has indicated that those who did leave the NPD, even including Thielen, are being invited back into the NPD.

NPD SCORE CARD

1.	Bundestag Elections 1965 -- NPD's first Effort	664,187 votes = 2%
2.	13 March 1966, communal Elections, Schleswig-Holstein. (NPD Has directive not to participate. A few did)	In 11 communities where NPD ran candidates, averaged 10.5% of vote compared with 6% in same towns in 1965.
3.	13 March 1966, Bavarian Communal Elections NPD major effort concentrated only in Franconia.	1.6 % of total Bavarian vote but: Middle Franconia = Ansbach - 5.1% Erlangen - 8.2% Nürnberg- 7.3% Scwhabach-5.6% Upper Franconia Bayreuth - 8.4% Coburg - 5.3% Kulmbach - 5.8% % + 2 village mayors
4.	27 March 1966 Hamburg Burgerschaft Election	3.9 % (1.8% in 1965) no candidates elected
5.	10 July 1966 Northrhein-Westphalia Landtag Election No NPD candidates elected none entered.	
6.	16 October 1966 Hamlin Byelection(Communal Concil)	8.4% ('65=) 2 seats
7.	6 November 1966 Hesse Landtag Elections	22[illegible],5[illegible] votes = 7.9%+ 8 Seats in Landtag Marburg,Wiesbaden, Darmstadt and Giesson =ca 10% Ff/M = 8.4%
7.	20 November 1966 Bavarian Landtag Elections	votes= 7.4% 15 Seats in Landtag
8.	23 April 1967 Rheinland-Palatine	4 Seats, 6.9 % of vote
9.	23 April 1967 Schleswig-Holstein	4 Seats, 5.7 % of vote
10.	4 June 1967 Lower Saxony	10 Seats, 7 % of vote
11.	11 October 1967 Bremen Burgerschaft	8 Seats, 8.8 % of vote
12.	28 April 1968 Baden-Wuerttemberg	12 Seats, 9.8 % of vote
13.	28 Sept 1969 Federal	0 Seats, 4.3% of vote

June 8, 1974

The Hitler Boom

by Charles Lam Markmann

Heidelberg

Had he lived Adolf Hitler would have been 85 years old on April 20. And it was on this April 20 that the forces responsible for the ouster of Chancellor Willy Brandt—for things must be called by their right names—had almost finished preparing West Germany for her start on the short march back to the past. One hears everywhere: "If we only had a strong man again." On the fashionable North Sea resort island of Sylt, Hitler's birthday was celebrated in the best National Socialist style by several dozen Germans, none over 25 [illegible] youngest 15, and all of them arrested on [illegible] having circulated or displayed Nazi symbols. [illegible] young men wore brown shirts and swastika armbands; the girls frumped themselves up in the dowdy blue skirts and white middy blouses of the *Bund deutscher Mädeln* (League of German Girls), the auxiliary of the *Hitler Jugend*. The walls of the room in which they held their party were decorated with pictures of Hitler and other National Socialist emblems for which they had scoured Schleswig-Holstein. After they had listened to records of Hitler's and other Nazi leaders' speeches and of old party march music, they drank a toast to the *Führer*.

When they were arrested, one of the young men said the party had been planned merely as "*ein guter Gag*." Perhaps so. But for millions of other Germans the re-creation of "the Nazi time" is serious business: for some, because they want those good old days back, and for a few because they fear the others may very easily get their wish when the Federal Republic of Germany must at last put its democracy to the test. The fear is heightened by the steady and at times spectacular rise in what is called *die Hitlerwelle*—the Hitler wave, or Hitler boom—which has kept pace with the economic crisis, price levels and unemployment. The number of jobless has doubled since December.

It is as much a Hitler and Hitler-associated boom as a Nazi boom. This is not to say that Nazi thinking has no following in West Germany—quite the contrary, as the letters-to-the-editor columns of newspapers demonstrate. In Bavaria—Nurnberg (indeed where else?), in a 17th-century Franconian castle, a 25-man "army" of youths trains regularly, with the same steel helmets and rifles that the *Wehrmacht* used from 1939 to 1945. Their leader is a sign-painter named Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, whose goals are simple: the destruction of communism and big capital, the end of parliamentary rule, government by an unelected *elite*, the annexation of Austria (which, as the Weimar Constitution makes clear in Article 61, was also the goal of the first German "republic"), and the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

There is a core of some 120,000 regular readers of the *National Zeitung*, which for two decades has been whitewashing the Nazi era, "proving" that the only concentration and extermination camps were those built after the war by German prisoners under American orders, for propaganda purposes (there are even pictures); promoting a brisk trade in Nazi medals, uniforms, weapons and other memorabilia, as well as books and recordings of speeches, party congresses, narrations of military campaigns (victorious ones), and engaging in a fairly subtle anti-Semitism. There is no need for blatancy; after all the Jews were only the first and most conspicuous of Nazi targets. Twelve or so million non-Jews murdered by the Germans died just as painfully—facts that are almost daily branded as "lies" in letters to newspapers, occasionally in demonstrations, less infrequently in swastika-daubings and cemetery vandalism.

But these things—the Sylt birthday party, Hoffmann's "army" (which ought to be taken seriously—the Nazi party's strength rose to *seven members* when Hitler joined it), the *National Zeitung*, the "antiquarians" whose windows and shops are filled exclusively with Wilhelmine and especially National Socialist *objets d'art*—are only symptoms of the *Hitlerwelle*. The real thing is far more widespread, far deeper and more "respectable." In West Berlin alone there are more than 500 cars bearing registration plates that, after the mandatory "B" (for Berlin), carry such letter combinations as SS, SA, HJ, KZ before the various numerals. These designations—for *Sturmschutzstaffel* (Elite Guard), *Sturmabteilung* (Storm Troops), *Hitler Jugend*, *Konzentrationslager* (concentration camp)—have not been issued routinely. They are issued by request, and Karl Koenig, the Social Democrat who heads the city's Economics Department, the issuing office, explains that under West German law such requests cannot be refused. (I am not for one moment implying that the law should be revised: one does not fight ideas, or even brute hatreds, with muzzles.) The

CHARLES LAM MARKMANN, *critic, translator and journalist, is at work on a book about the two German republics.*

same kinds of plates are visible in many other parts of Federal Germany.

There are now in print literally thousands of paperback titles dealing with every possible aspect of the Third Reich and its personalities. There are serious, analytical histories that sacrifice success for integrity; on the other hand two big, exhaustive, expensive biographies of Hitler are selling more than well, and one of them, by Joachim C. Fest, an editor of the arch-reactionary *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, has gone well past 275,000 copies at almost $20 apiece—the publishers have 25,000 more ready and waiting in the warehouse. This book makes much of Hitler's "modernity," little of his barbarities: he was necessary to his time. The other, which is much more overtly an apologia—is by Werner Maser, who teaches the Hitler era at the University of Munich. It has sold 30,000 copies. It endeavors to create the impression that, had he not had certain problems arising out of misguided medication in 1938, Hitler would have done more good (and less harm).

In addition there are the big hardcover editions of Hitler's speeches (four volumes) and Propaganda Minister Paul Joseph Goebbels' (two volumes); four new books about Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy who is now, at 80, the last prisoner in Spandau, innumerable radio and television programs dealing with various aspects and personalities of the period; and, most lately, a fortnightly publication, *Das dritte Reich*, planned to cover the whole "*NS-Zeit*" for popular consumption in two years, and then expire.

The Allies—especially the Americans—for a long time forbade any mention whatever of the Hitler period, and West Germany, once it became a more or less independent state, continued these bans for years. Even more than other peoples, Germans have the touching notion that censorship and repression will effectively eliminate ideas and facts; and, against this, neither the left nor the right has the faintest concept of civil liberties. Thus it is still forbidden, even though the German Communist party has been legalized again, to form a "Nazi" or "National Socialist" party. Consequently the old SA and SS men organized the totally Nazi *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*,

In England and in the US there has been a revival of interest in the Hitler era paralleling the one in West Germany. At least 12 English and American publishers have capitalized on this interest. Here's a sampling of their recent books:

Pictures: *Sieg Heil!*, an illustrated history of Germany from Bismark to Hitler, by Stefan Lorant (Norton), more than 700 photographs and a literate text. *Hitler Close-up* (Macmillan), interesting because these are the pictures taken by Hitler's friend Heinrich Hoffmann, with commentary by confidant and diarist Henry Picker.

History: *Hitler's Rise to Power, The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933*, by Geoffrey Pridham (Harper & Row). In-depth answer to the question, what made people support Hitler in the early '20s? Careful and scholarly.

Military: *Hitler's War Aims, The Establishment of the New Order*, by Norman Rich (Norton). The second volume of a huge, hugely detailed study dealing with Hitler's foreign policies. *The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe*, by David Irving (Little, Brown), the life of Field Marshall Erhard Milch who was second in command to Goering and who survived to tell much of this to the author. *The Admiral's Wolf Pack*, by Jean Noli (Doubleday), containing authentic first-hand accounts of U-boat (Grey Wolves) actions. *Battle Over the Reich*, by Alfred Price (Cambridge University Press), contains pictures and text about the bombing and strafing of German cities and towns. Part of the revival because it is Germany seen as destroyed from the air. *Hitler's Strategy, 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue*, by Martin van Creveld (Cambridge University Press), a new view of Hitler's interest in the Mediterranean and his relations with Italy.

Religion: *The German Church Struggle and the Holocaust* (Wayne University Press), a collection of essays that grew out of the First International Scholars' Conference in 1970.

Refugees: *Island Refuge*, by A. J. Sherman (University of California Press). An interesting study of how Britain changed her policy about refugees from the Third Reich from 1933 to 1939 and why.

Persons: *Target: Heydrich*, by Miroslav Ivanov (Macmillan). Play-by-play account of the assassination of Czech occupation head Reinhard Heydrich and the Nazi revenge that culminated in Lidice. *Hitler*, by Joachim Fest (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), the English translation by Richard and Clara Winston of the biography in which Fest concludes that if Hitler had died or been killed in 1938 "few would hesitate to call him one of the greatest of German statesmen," which may be why the book is seven-eighths over before we come to the Hitler of the war years. Werner Maser's *Hitler Legend: Myth and Reality* (Harper & Row). Enormously detailed with so many facts they obscure the man and his works.

Future: To be published by Viking in August, already published in England (Secker & Warburg), *The Loneliest Man in the World*, the "inside story of the 30-year imprisonment of Rudolf Hess," inside because the author, Eugene K[illegible]ard, was former commandant of Spandau Prison and seems to have won Hess' confidence. Despite its promises it says very little that has not already been known or surmised.

—*The Editors*

which, after some initial successes, took cover in the hardly inhospitable Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions but has recently announced its determination to purge itself of this "taint." In addition in spite of the constitutional ban (Article 18) on any use of civil liberties to endanger the undefined "free democratic basic order," the state of Lower Saxony alone has 34 active Fascist and Nazi organizations, publishing houses, and mail-order book distributors. No one knows how many members and customers they have because they operate furtively, as the rather stupid law compels them to do. *Mut (Courage)*, a monthly magazine addressing a frankly Fascist if not Nazi program to the young in that state, has a circulation of 10,000 and is regarded by the Lower Saxon Minister of the Interior as potentially or latently dangerous.

Everywhere there is curiosity about those mysterious 12 years. The teachers who taught then are still teaching, unless superannuated, but very few of them dare to teach what they used to teach, or even to talk about "the past." That is why *Das dritte Reich* was founded this year: to make money out of that curiosity. The idea was that of Hans-Peter Dietze, now its managing editor, according to his editor-in-chief, Dr. Christian Zentner, who stakes a pious claim to a desire to show his young compatriots how the Third Reich came to pass, in order to prevent its ever happening again. After four issues, Dr. Zentner is not so sure that his publisher, the big Hamburg house of John Jahr Verlag KG, will do much more than break even, because, he told me, what millions of people are insatiably interested in is not "the abstractions" of nazism and its history but its personalities, and in particular Adolf Hitler. These, he says, are "simple" people who do not read books but who watch television and read magazines, and it was they whom he set out to capture – to clarify the past for them.

His magazine is expensive – about $1.50 a copy. A tremendous advertising campaign, of dubious taste, resulted in first-issue sales some 150,000 above the 250,000 copies that the editors and publishers expected. The second issue sold between 330,000 and 340,000 copies, the third something over 250,000 so far, and the fourth – which is still on the newsstands – more than 200,000. The overwhelming majority of the purchasers and subscribers, Zentner admits, seems to include *few* of those young people he was looking for. the real circulation is among the people old enough to remember, the Nazis who write furious letters to the editor because he tarnishes their legends. Both Dietze and Zentner told me that the greatest sales of *Das dritte Reich* are not in cities but out in the country and the small towns, in Bavaria and Franconia especially.

One of the reasons for the phenomenal success of a television program called *"Ein Herz und eine Seele"* ("One Heart and One Soul") is its enthusiastically enjoyed derogations of the sub-men, by name: the Slavs, the Jews, the Latins, the Levantines. A German exaggeration of "All in the Family," the program plays also on the hysterical dread of "the Communists" that has been endemic here ever since the general staff realized in 1918 that it had made a terrible mistake in helping Lenin in 1917. Ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt was a constant target because of his illegitimate birth and his "traitorous" conduct from 1935 to 1945, when he fought against nazism, as well as his "selling out" to "the Reds." The program regularly attracts 60-65 per cent of the national audience, and only an occasional editorial writer or commentator dares to see its popularity for the danger it is. Its "left-liberal" creator, Wolfgang Menge, claims it to be a satire and so recognized because people say its protagonist, Alfred Tetzlaff, sounds just like Franz Josef Strauss, the head of the CSU: but then in each regional election this year more of them vote for the Strausses.

In mid-March the Bavarian State Radio and Television broadcast a long interview with Hitler's (and Franklin Roosevelt's) old friend, Ernst (Putzi) Hanfstaengl, who is now 87. Though in the end – through a rather gruesome practical joke – he felt he had to flee to the United States in 1937, and was materially assisted by Roosevelt, his old Harvard classmate, in gaining entry (later he became an adviser on policy to the American forces!), Hanfstaengl spent his whole time on camera telling what fine fellows Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Himmler and the others really were, when all was said and done – and masters of their trades to boot: fine soldiers, geniuses at propaganda, *und so weiter*. Their Weimar predecessors he belittled and dismissed as nothings, though he admitted he had never known much about their aspirations or their achievements. Moreover in spite of having, with his wife and sister, lavishly and almost single-mindedly supported Hitler from the days before the 1923 Munchen *Putsch* to his own abrupt departure for the decadent democracy, Hanfstaengl insisted that he had never thought for a moment that the unremitting virulent anti-Semitism of his friend and hero would ever amount to anything serious ("some of my best friends were . . ."), or that his protege would ever have been "stupid enough to start a war."

The real danger of a Hitler renascence, in the view of Dr. Hugo Marx, a scholar who suffered under the original, lies in the combination of a romantic nostalgia and the millennial German faith in authoritarian rule as the solution to all problems. Weimar, after all, failed primarily, as both William B. Shirer and Karl Dietrich Bracher have shown, because no one, including the Social Democrats who proclaimed it out of desperation when they could find neither a Hohenzollern nor any other royalty to accept the throne, wanted a republic. When the economic crash came after 1929, the millennial search for the "strong man" lost its last restraint.

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS -311/01424-72

DATE DISTR. 14 March 1972

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI March 1972

SUBJECT Intention of the Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party to Urge Non-participation of the Party in Baden-Wuerttemberg Election

WP 2.4

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (10 March 1972)

FIELD NO. EGG-1825

SOURCE An official West German security service at the Land level. Analogous information from other West German services should not be construed as confirmation. The sub-source is an NPD official who had access to the information.

1. The executive committee of the West German National Democratic Party (NPD) will meet on 18 March with officials of the Baden-Wuerttemberg NPD organization and attempt to persuade the Land organization not to contest the 23 April Land election. The executive committee will point out that if the NPD does not run candidates in this election, the chances for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to obtain a majority in the Baden-Wuerttemberg election will be enhanced. This would enable the CDU to retain its Bundesrat majority and improve the chances of defeating the Eastern treaties of the Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party government.

2. The background of the executive committee's desire to avoid contesting the Baden-Wuerttemberg election is its estimate that the NPD would capture only two per cent of the vote this year compared with 9.4 per cent in the last election, a result which the executive committee is most anxious to avoid.

3. Field Dissem: Sent to Bonn and Berlin.

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SECRET

CITE TDCS -314/12543-71

DIST 1 DECEMBER 1971

COUNTRY WEST GERMANY

DOI NOVEMBER 1971

SUBJECT SUMMARY OF ADOLF VON THADDEN'S 3 DECEMBER SPEECH TO THE NORTH-WEST MINING ASSOCIATION

ACQ GERMANY, HAMBURG (23 NOVEMBER 1971) FIELD NO. EGG-1721

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SECURITY SERVICE AT THE LAND LEVEL. ANALOGOUS INFORMATION FROM OTHER WEST GERMAN SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS CONFIRMATION. THE SUB-SOURCE IS AN NPD OFFICIAL WHO HAD ACCESS TO A COPY OF THE DRAFT SPEECH.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: ADOLF VON T H A D D E N, FORMER NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE WEST GERMAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NPD), HAS BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK TO THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE NORTHWEST MINING ASSOCIATION, SPOKANE, WASHINGTON, ON 3 DECEMBER ON THE TOPIC: A EUROPEAN'S VIEW OF THE AMERICAN CURRENCY PROBLEM. SEE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL HAMBURG TELEGRAM 767, 10 NOVEMBER 1971. DESPITE VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION FROM HIS NPD POST HE STILL PLANS TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND

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(classification) (dissem controls)

TO PRESENT THE SPEECH WHICH IS SUMMARIZED BELOW.)

2. VON THADDEN BEGINS BY TRACING THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES' RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE PRESENT, DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THE 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH. HE GIVES CREDIT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR HELPING EUROPE BACK ON ITS FEET AFTER WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN. BUT POINTS OUT THAT THE NATIONS WHICH WERE HELPED USED THE AID TO BUILD AN EXPORT BASE WHICH NOW IS CONTRIBUTING TO AMERICA'S FINANCIAL TROUBLES. HE SAYS THAT GERMANY AND OTHER COUNTRIES BECAME INFECTED WITH AN "EXPORT HYSTERIA" AFTER THE WAR WHICH HAD SHORT TERM BENEFITS FOR WORLD TRADE, BUT WHICH IN THE LONG RUN DAMAGED THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES.

3. THE 15 AUGUST 1971 SPEECH BY PRESIDENT NIXON IS COMPARED WITH THE 24 OCTOBER 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH, AND VON THADDEN SAYS THAT THE SPEECH WILL HAVE JUST AS PROFOUND AN EFFECT ON THE WORLD'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM AS DID THE CRASH. HE DEPICTS THE SPEECH AND THE RESULTING CONTROLS AS SPELLING THE END OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ESTABLISHED AT BRETTON-WOODS.

4. IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE TYPE OF WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD FOLLOW THE CURRENT AMERICAN CONTROLS AND FLOATING OF THE DOLLAR, VON THADDEN DRAWS HEAVILY FROM THE 23 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE OF FRENCH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU. HE SAYS THAT THE DOLLAR CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED THE SINGLE WORLD CURRENCY. THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF EUROPE MAKES IT NECESSARY THAT A EUROPEAN RESERVE CURRENCY BE AVAILABLE AS A SECOND WORLD CURRENCY. THIS CANNOT BE THE BRITISH POUND AS MANY PEOPLE AT ONE TIME WOULD HAVE BELIEVED, BUT MUST BE A CURRENCY ACCEPTED BY BOTH FRANCE AND GERMANY AND ADMINISTERED BY A COMMON GERMAN-FRENCH BANK SUPPORTED BY GOLD. ALL EUROPEAN STATES WOULD USE THIS BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS. VON THADDEN VIEWS POMPIDOU'S SPEECH AS A SIGNAL TO THE UNITED STATES THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WILLING TO STAY PERMANENTLY UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON, AND AS PROVIDING AN OUTLINE OF THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC ORDER EUROPE SHOULD HAVE IN THE FUTURE. HE CRITICIZES THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT FOR NOT TAKING A SIMILAR STAND, SAYING THAT WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE STATE TO PUT ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON OTHER STATES, THE SITUATION CAN LEAD TO

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POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE PROFITABLE ONLY TO THE COMMUNISTS.

5. VON THADDEN SEES TWO ALTERNATIVES IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, I.E., EITHER A RETURN TO FIRM PARITY WITH A DEVALUED DOLLAR, OR A CHANGE TO FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AGREED TO BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND GUARANTEED BY INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES. HE BELIEVES THE DOLLAR MUST BE DEVALUED BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT EXPECT EUROPEANS TO CONTINUE TO BUY THE DOLLAR AT A RATE WHICH IS NOT LEGALLY FIXED. HE VIEWS FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AS DESIRABLE FOR EUROPE, BUT NOT REALIZABLE AT PRESENT BECAUSE THIS SYSTEM WOULD EXCLUDE THE "THIRD WORLD" AND THUS WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES.

6. SUMMARIZING, VON THADDEN STRESSES THE NECESSITY FOR THE FREE WORLD TO REMAIN STRONG AND FOR EACH EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO RETAIN ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DIGNITY TO PREVENT DOMINATION BY COMMUNIST AND FAR-LEFT FORCES. HE CRITICIZES THOSE WHO SAY THAT AMERICA IS NO LONGER NEEDED AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE USSR, DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO OTHER COUNTRY WHICH CAN SERVE IN THIS CAPACITY, ESPECIALLY NOT PRESENT DAY WEST GERMANY. HE SAYS THAT THE WEST

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

GERMAN PEOPLE, THROUGH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND LEADERS WHO ARE FRIENDLY TO COMMUNISM, HAVE LOST THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER AND ARE TOO WEAK TO OPPOSE THE USSR. HE ENDS BY CALLING FOR A CHARACTER RENAISSANCE IN THE FREE WORLD TO MAKE IT STRONG ENOUGH TO COUNTER COMMUNISM. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE STATEMENT OF VON THADDEN IN SPOKANE MAY ATTRACT PRESS INTEREST DUE TO THE NOTORIETY HE GAINED IN RECENT YEARS AS LEADER OF A GERMAN NATIONALIST PARTY WIDELY DESCRIBED AS NEO-NAZI. IN FACT, THE PARTY HAS DECLINED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION, AND VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY DEPRIVES HIM OF ANY POLITICAL PLATFORM IN WEST GERMANY.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: NONE (SENT BONN).

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Intelligence Information Report

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS-311/01861-71

DATE DISTR. 10 March 1971

2JP24

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI March 1971

SUBJECT Intention of Adolf Von Thadden to Resign As Chairman of the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (8 March 1971) FIELD NO. EGG-1682

SOURCE An official West German Security Service concerned with right and left radical organizations, from sources described as NPD officials, who have access to the information. Similar information received through other West German intelligence channels should not be construed as confirmation.

1. In early March 1971 Adolf Von T h a d d e n indicated to close associates including members of the Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands - NPD) that he plans to resign as Chairman of the NPD in the near future. Von Thadden has not announced the date when he plans to resign but close associates believe it will be sometime during the period 1 April to 1 June 1971.

2. Von Thadden's decision has been prompted by his discouragement over prospects for the NPD, serious financial difficulties of the party and by severe internal bickering within the NPD Executive Committee during the past several weeks. Von Thadden is basically more moderate than many members of the Executive Committee. Among other disagreements, Von Thadden has opposed certain aspects of the "Resistance Action" - (Aktion Widerstand) in which NPD members have recently staged demonstrations which erupted into violence. Von Thadden was also personally humiliated when his sister and other relatives asked him not to attend the funeral of Von Thadden's brother-in-law, the well-known historian Percy S c h r a m m who died in Goettingen in January 1971.

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S E C R E T (classification) NO FOREIGN DISSEM (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

E/R	1	CA/INT	2
E/G/R	2	CA/PEG	1
E/G/R/JE	1		
E/G/R/BM	1		
E/G/R (WP 2.4)	1		

TOTALS: IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6, CA 3

LIAISON 32

EGG-1682
HAMBURG 19934
IN 282656

COORDINATING RELEASING

HM:JM: [illegible]:sam

S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

3. (Source Comment: Von Thadden's resignation will in all probability mean the end of the NPD as an effective political organization. With the possible exception of the Bavarian District Chairman of the NPD, Dr. Siegfried P o e h l m a n n, the NPD lacks effective and dynamic leaders. Poehlmann, however, has health problems and also does not have the stature of Von Thadden. The disintegration of the NPD will probably result in a number of smaller right-wing groups coming into existence, some of which, like the recent "Aktion Widerstand" may have a propensity for violence. After the NPD disintegrates, most of its former supporters will probably cast their votes for one of the three major political parties in West Germany. The CDU and CSU stand to gain most of these votes.)

4. Field Dissem: None.

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14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS -311/02895-70

DATE DISTR. 3 April 1970

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI Mid-February 1970

SUBJECT Analysis of the West German National Democratic Party's Election Chances and Cohesiveness

ACQ Germany (27 February 1970)

FIELD NO. OGA-953

SOURCE A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD), from an NPD official who attended the party congress. The report is the NPD official's analysis of the party's situation in the wake of the congress. The information is also passed to an official West German service, from which similar information should not be construed as confirmation.

1. Adolf von T h a d d e n, NPD chairman, remains firmly in control of the party following the 14-15 February 1970 NPD congress in Wertheim.

2. Skepticism about the future of the NPD is increasing among party leaders. The NPD is definitely planning to wage vigorous campaigns in all 1970 Land elections, but there appears to be little chance that the party will do even as well in these elections as it did in the 1969 Bundestag elections, when it failed to obtain five percent of the total vote.

3. At the congress, several prominent NPD leaders emphasized the need for party unity; these appeals were well received by the delegates. There are many unresolved questions and problems, however, which will continue to plague the party. For instance, the "national-conservative" concept, which was adopted in the manifesto issued by the congress, came under strong attack. One group, which includes both older and younger members, rejects the concept of the NPD as a conservative party, because they consider that this term conveys the idea that the party is an out-of-date and reactionary political group. On the other hand, the proponents of the national-conservative concept consider themselves as upholding "positive values" in the face of manifestations of disintegration. Von Thadden is the party's unifying force, and one delegate accurately summarized the situation by saying: "Von Thadden, by virtue of the charisma of his speeches, succeeded in bridging the many cracks in the party."

4. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	[illegible]	[illegible]	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

E/G/W 1			OGA-953 CATERROR
E/G/R 2			
C/E/G/W 1			
E/R 1			
E/G/R/WP 2,4	1	NO LIAISON	COORDINATING / RELEASING HM:CHW lah
TOTALS		LIAISON	
IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6			

(20)

S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS-311/08556-69

DATE DISTR. 26 September 1969

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI June 1968, 1 September 1969

SUBJECT West German Ministry of Interior Evaluation of the Prospects of Banning the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany (1 September 1969)

FIELD NO. OGA-913

SOURCE A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had access to the study during his official duties. The information was extracted from the original document and is believed to be an accurate summary of its highlights.

Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the West German National Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given below describes the major charges which the government could bring against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make against these charges, and the probable political results which would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the NPD. According to the source, this study is still considered the basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land) officials. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: For several years, West German political and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court ban on the NPD. On 13 November 1968, Ernst B e n d a, West German Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg K i e s i n g e r that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against the NPD. Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, and the subject became embroiled in West German politics. On 23 April 1969, the Federal Cabinet decided not to seek a court ban of the NPD, at least until after the September elections. This decision was prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains and apparently was losing popular support.)

S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1	E/G/R/C	1				OGA-913 CATERROR
E/G/R	2	E/G/R(WF	2	4)	1		
E/G/W	1	E/BERLIN	2				
C/E/G/W	1						
E/G/R/P	1					NO LIAISON	COORDINATING / RELEASING HM:CH:sro
TOTALS		IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 8(2)				LIAISON 32	

2. In June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared a 50-page study of the prospects for banning the NPD entitled "Considerations Regarding a Ban of the National Democratic Party." The study was well prepared and carefully written. It is still considered the basic Interior Ministry paper on the NPD and is being studied by senior officials of both the federal and state governments. It avoids giving an opinion on the prospects of obtaining a court decision against the NPD, but from the content of the study, it is clear that the authors believed that the courts would probably reject a government proposal to ban the NPD. (Field Comment: If the study is still considered current, it is unclear how it fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there was sufficient evidence to obtain a ban against the NPD.)

3. The study summarized the case which could be brought against the NPD as follows:

a. It could be shown that there was a similarity between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) which has been outlawed.

b. It could be argued that the goals, and parts of the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the principles of a free democratic state.

The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be presented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without a hearing.

4. The study lists the following points which the NPD could be expected to use in its defense:

a. The party could prove that it has given firm instructions to its members not to engage in rowdyism or violence.

b. It could show that a sizeable number of former NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.

c. It could point out many features of its program which are in accord with democratic principles.

d. It could show that its elected representatives have worked with other parties and have not disrupted the Landtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which they participate.

e. It could point out that other political parties have many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.

f. It would charge that the government's charges were one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.

g. It would claim that not all of Professor Ernst A n r i c h ' s points were included in the party platform. (Field Comment: Anrich is a former university professor from Darmstadt whose proposals were apparently more extreme than those incorporated in the party platform.)

h. It could claim that the increased violence (Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.

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5. The study states that it would be very difficult to refute these NPD defenses in court. The government would have to admit that since early 1968 there have been very few statements made by NPD leaders, or incidents caused by the NPD, which could be used to support the government's case. Objectively, it would have to be admitted that many incidents of violence in which the NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.

6. The study predicts the following probable results should the government win its case against the NPD:

a. The NPD would probably respect the prohibition. It is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to go underground as the illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.

b. NPD members and sympathizers would not change their opinions because of a ban. Many would join other groups or parties and continue to work for their political beliefs.

c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a campaign for the banning of the new German Communist Party (DKP) and other leftist groups.

d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign countries.

7. The study concludes that if the government should lose a case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid evidence (Beweisschwierigkeiten). In such an event, the following adverse effects would occur:

a. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable publicity.

b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some success in keeping former Nazis out of key positions would be halted.

c. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of the stigma of being associated with a party which could be declared illegal, would join the party or become active supporters.

d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members. (Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried because the party's membership has not increased significantly during the past 18 months.)

8. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

TO: Chief of Base, Berlin

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany

FROM: Chief, European Division

SUBJECT: CALL/INTEL
NPD Activities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: EGBT-14589, dated 9 September 1969

WP 2.4

1. We are very pleased with the quality of the information on the NPD which has been made available through CATERROR. It is particularly useful during this pre-election period, but we also appreciate not having to wait 6 to 8 weeks for CAWHISPER to digest the material and pass it on.

2. After looking over the Reference, we are inclined to stick with the requirements mentioned in DIRECTOR 39284 for items worthy of intel dissemination. In this context Bonn State Department Telegram 12253 dated 17 September quotes Foreign Minister Brandt as saying that there has been evidence that the East Germans, undoubtedly with Soviet approval, had given financial support to von Thadden. While we are inclined to think that Brandt's comment may be wishful thinking, evidence of East German financing for the NPD would be of great interest and utility. Material not bearing on the requirements in DIRECTOR 39284 should be forwarded now to Headquarters for review. The NPD, as you know, is a subject of interest beyond its proportions as a political force, and we are grateful for the timely opportunity to keep up with the ins and outs of it.

Harriet G. Cocollato
Harriet G. COCOLLATO

2 - COB/Berlin
2 - COS/Germany

Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	EGBS-6522	30 SEP 1969 25 September 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	

2 - E/G/R
1 - E/G/IS
1 - E/REG/Chrono
1 - C/EUR/R
1 - C/E/G/R

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
E/G/R	Cassandra Horton	sro	6196

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/E/G/R	26 Sept '69	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/E/R		

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS -311/05430-69

DATE DISTR. 22 September 1969

WP 2.4

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI Early August 1969

SUBJECT Miscellaneous Information on the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (15 August 1969)

FIELD NO. EGG-1444

SOURCE Member of the National Democratic Party in Schleswig-Holstein whose reliability has not yet been established. He obtained the information from two district officials of the Party.

1. According to a ranking official of the Kiel district of the National Democratic Party (NPD), Karl-Heinz K n i p p h a l s, the chairman of the Kiel district of the NPD, and Adolf v o n T h a d d e n, the national chairman of the NPD, are personal enemies. (Source Comment: In January 1969 Knipphals was elected to be his party district's candidate for the West German Parliament. Knipphals, a Kiel lawyer, is in his early 50's. He was severely wounded during World War II and has only one arm.)

2. Von Thadden is aware of, and unhappy about, the fact that Knipphals, prior to joining the NPD, participated in Easter Marches and received unfavorable publicity. Furthermore, von Thadden is concerned about Knipphals' strong and ruthless political ambitions. He has referred to Knipphals as a "second Hitler", and he welcomes and encourages the fact that there is strong opposition to Knipphals even within the Kiel district of the party. Von Thadden, for the above reasons, would very much like to see Knipphals remain on the district level and is anxious to keep him out of the West German Parliament.

3. The same official who made the remarks about von Thadden and Knipphals also stated that many wealthy industrialists contribute funds to the NPD anonymously, because they do not wish their association or sympathy with the party to become known.

4. The chairman of another NPD district in Schleswig-Holstein stated that, in view of the fact that each new

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1	EGG-1444 CAINFER
E/G/R	2	
E/G/R/P	1	
E/G/R/C	1	
E/G/W	1	NO LIAISON
TOTALS IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6	LIAISON	COORDINATING / RELEASING HM:CH:

S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

session of the West German Parliament is opened by its oldest member, the NPD will insure that the oldest member of the next Parliament will be an NPD man. (Headquarters Comment: The possibility that an NPD Deputy might open the Bundestag has already been considered by the CDU. See CS-311/08164-69.)

5. Field Dissem: None (sent Bonn, Berlin)

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. CS LT-313/01123-69

DATE DISTR. 9 July 1969

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI 1 January 1969

SUBJECT German Government Evidence against the National Democratic Party (NPD)

WP 2.4

ACQ Germany, Bonn (26 March 1969)

FIELD NO. EGN-4107

SOURCE An official West German security service.

1. A 77-page German-language report, describing the National Democratic Party (NPD) and presenting documentary and testimonial evidence of possibly unconstitutional aspects of the NPD, has been deposited in the files of the CIA Document and Pictorial Services Division, from which copies may be obtained upon request. The report is the shorter of two versions prepared by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz). This shorter version is said to be complete in substance and is the version which was made available to West German Cabinet members in preparation for Cabinet discussion of whether the NPD should be banned. The longer, two-volume version has not been obtained.

2. Appraisal of the legal validity of the evidence against the NPD was omitted from the report at the order of the Minister of the Interior, who reserved to himself an assessment of the NPD's legality. Also, pages 9 to 13--a section entitled Chief Features of the Ideology (Grundzuege der Ideologie)--was omitted from the report at the request of the Minister of the Interior. (Headquarters Comment: The evidence in the report appears to be overt and less than conclusive. The West German Cabinet decided in the spring of 1969 not to request a ban of the NPD; substantial doubt existed as to whether there were sufficient grounds to obtain a legal ban of the NPD. The omissions from the text, referred to in this paragraph, may reflect realization by the Interior Ministry of the weakness of the case against the NPD.)

4. Field Dissemination: U. S. Embassy Bonn (limited).

Distribution of Attachment:

CRS/ADD

CONFIDENTIAL (classification) NO FOREIGN DISSEM (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1	E/G/R (WP2.4) - 1		CAWHISPER EGN-4107
C/E/G	1	E/G/R/L	1	
E/G/INT	1	E/G/R/P	1	
E/G/CE	1	E/Bonn	2	
E/G/R	2			COORDINATING / RELEASING: RM:JL rmm
TOTALS: IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 9(2)		LIAISON: 32		

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS -311/06103 -69

DATE DISTR. 7 July 1969

COUNTRY West Berlin/West Germany

DOI March to Mid-May 1969

SUBJECT Status Report on Problems, Activities and Plans of the West Berlin National Democratic Party

WP 2.4

ACQ. Germany, Berlin (March - Mid-May 1969)

FIELD NO. EGB-24,611

SOURCE Intercepted communications, supplemented by information from a member of the West Berlin National Democratic Party (NPD) with close contacts among members of the Berlin NPD Executive Council and a record of accurate reporting.

Summary: The Berlin NPD has been plagued by a split between the Berlin City leadership, which is loyal to the Party's national leaders, and the "Loyalists" headed by the Berlin district leaders, who opposed the dissolution of the Berlin NPD ordered by National Party Chairman Adolf von Thadden in October 1968. Court action led to the thwarting of the plan for dissolution. In an effort to keep the Berlin Party alive, in mid-March von Thadden ordered a cessation of open Party activities until after the September parliamentary elections. Subsequently, von Thadden arranged a postponement of a scheduled Berlin Party convention until October, because of the possibility of a ban on the Berlin NPD by the Allies and the threat of trouble from the militant left. At the end of March, Berlin City NPD Chief Rudolf Kendzia resigned in an effort to promote party unity in Berlin, but he remains active behind the scenes. Since early April, the Berlin NPD leadership has followed von Thadden's guidelines. The influence of the Loyalists has been greatly reduced, and in accordance with von Thadden's instructions party activities have been circumspect. Both the Berlin and the National leadership are hoping that the NPD will obtain 25 to 35 Bundestag seats in September, which, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to right-wing voters in Berlin and enhance NPD chances during the 1971 Berlin communal elections. Berlin is planning to send volunteer workers to campaign for the NPD in West Germany, especially in North Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD stronghold. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: In October 1968, the West Berlin NPD had approximately 480 dues-paying members. According to a senior party official, more than 100 members have officially dropped their

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1	E/G/CE	1	CA/INT	1			EGB-24,611 CAYANK CAVANISH
E/G/R	2	E/G/INT	1	CA/PROP	2			
E/G/R/L	1	E/SI	1					
E G R P	1	CIOP EU	2					
E G R (WP2)	4	✓ - 1						COORDINATING / RELEASING HM/JL
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 9, CA 3							LIAISON *	rmm

membership and others are dropping out quietly. In March the paid-up membership was about 300.)

2. Following the abortive attempt by the National Democratic Party (NPD) leadership to force the Berlin NPD to dissolve itself for tactical reasons in October 1968, routine party activity resumed almost immediately. It was characterized by a split between the leadership of the Berlin City (Landesverband) party unit and that of district (Kreisverband) party units. The former are generally loyal to National Party Chairman Adolf von Thadden and the national leadership in Hanover and their broader tactical concepts, while the latter, referred to as the "Loyalists" (Satzungstreue), defend the letter of the Berlin NPD statutes. The Loyalists initially objected primarily to the method of the attempted dissolution, but the friction with the city Executive Committee (Landesvorstand) headed by Rudolf Kendzia led to total mutual mistrust, disloyal statements to the press, and efforts to get each other expelled from the party by a party court (Schiedsgericht).

3. At a general membership meeting in Berlin on 15 March 1969, von Thadden attempted to achieve a truce within the party and ordered that there be no "political organizational activity" until after the September 1969 parliamentary elections. At this meeting von Thadden approved the scheduling of a Berlin party convention (Landesparteitag) for 26 April 1969, at which a new and hopefully more stable city Executive Committee was to be elected.

4. The 15 March meeting provided an indication that the Berlin NPD may well stick together under von Thadden's guidance until 1971, in spite of the friction between city and district leadership. Although the eight spokesmen for the local leadership, who took the floor after Kendzia's situation report and von Thadden's keynote speech, approved the action of the Berlin NPD districts in opposing the self-dissolution of the local party, and no one contradicted them, all but 31 of the 140 members present then voted for a resolution condemning District Chiefs Johann Ratzek (Schoeneberg) and Philipp Goelles (Wilmersdorf), leaders of the Loyalists, for anti-party activity. This vote amounted to a vote of confidence in the tactics of the Berlin City leadership, and according to members present was due solely to von Thadden's presence and influence. In the view of these members, a meeting without the attendance of representatives of the Hanover headquarters would have led to a no-confidence vote in the Kendzia leadership. During the meeting, von Thadden also rejected Kendzia's "Berlin Program," which called for a softer line on East Germany and on German reunification.

5. At the 15 March session, left-wing, anti-NPD protestors assaulted a number of NPD members and forced the NPD twice to change its meeting site. This leftist action and the obvious fact that the militant left has a penetration of the Berlin NPD have had a seriously dampening effect on the NPD's willingness to meet in the open. The party is now tentatively planning to hold future meetings on a rented excursion boat whose location would not be announced until the time of the meeting.

6. The Berlin NPD has made strenuous efforts to determine which left-wing organizations made up the task force which tried to disrupt the 15 March meeting. The Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) claimed the honor, but the NPD investigation showed definitely that all but a handful of the protestors were an organized group dispatched by the Spandau branch of the West Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SEW) whose actions are part of a long-range program of harassment by the East Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED).

7. Because of the subsequent possible threats of prohibition by the Allies (signalled by a letter from Governing Mayor Klaus Schuetz to the Allies asking that the NPD in Berlin be banned) and of further counter-demonstrations by the militant left, on 27 March von Thadden wrote a letter to the Berlin City leadership asking that

the Berlin party convention be postponed until October 1969, the normal expiration date of the term of the present city Executive Committee and well after the national elections. The letter, which was read at several district meetings, also stipulated that the city and district organizations were to restrict themselves to routine monthly meetings with no speeches and no invited guests until next October.

8. In a tactical move to promote party unity, Party Chief Kendzia resigned on 28 March. In response to von Thadden's letter, the Berlin district ~~party~~ unit leadership, which otherwise remained intact, called a session of the Berlin Party Council (Landesausschuss) on 10 April to approve the postponement of the party convention. (Field Comment: The Party Council consists of the Executive Committee plus the 12 district leaders.) Walter Seezen, a member of the national leadership, was present. The situation was ticklish because the Berlin NPD statutes provide that if full membership meetings in four of the 12 districts had voted for holding of the party convention in April, the postponement motion would fail; there was a distinct danger that this could occur. At the 10 April meeting, the district leaders grumbled but approved the postponement until 11 October.

9. On Kendzia's resignation, Guenther Mensel, a member of the Executive Committee, was selected as Acting Party Chief and Speaker of the Party Council until a new Executive Committee is elected in October. Mensel, an attorney, was hesitant about accepting the job because of its possible effect on his practice, and did not commit himself until the 10 April executive meeting. Mensel's age (62) and stability were the main reasons for his selection. The only other replacement considered was Guenter Kleinert, also on the Executive Committee, whom Kendzia did not trust. Mensel's duties are to consist of calling and chairing pro-forma monthly Executive Committee meetings and of presiding at the party congress next October.

10. Kendzia considers his resignation a temporary tactical retreat caused by disagreements with the NPD national and Berlin district leaders, by von Thadden's public rejection of his "Berlin Program," loss of business because of unfavorable publicity, and a hit-and-run car accident involving a bicyclist on 27 March. Kendzia promised Mensel to remain active behind the scenes and set up a vacant office in his place of business as party headquarters, with desks for himself and Executive Committee members Frank Schwerdt, Joachim Rebuschat and Hans Werner Andreas, the de facto heads of the Berlin NPD.

11. Kendzia and a majority of the NPD leaders hope that the fall elections will bring some 25 to 35 NPD members into the Bundestag. This, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to potential right-wing voters in Berlin and thus enable the NPD to make a showing in the 1971 Berlin communal elections. (Source Comment: The Berlin NPD's major problem in Berlin is to keep its membership intact and its machinery functioning until 1971. Whether Kendzia will hold to his promise to direct the Berlin NPD from behind the scenes indefinitely, and whether he will emerge as leader in 1971, are open questions, because Kendzia has shown an interest in the current program and policies of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and particularly in its "General-Contract" concept, which fits in with his "Berlin Program." A close friend of Kendzia's, (fnu) Nerchert, resigned from the NPD to protest its participation in the presidential election in Berlin on 5 March and has already made overtures to the FDP.)

12. Since Kendzia's resignation and the 10 April executive meeting, the Berlin City Executive Committee (under Kendzia's behind-the-scenes tutelage) has kept the Berlin NPD functioning and loyal to the Hanover leadership. Executive Committee members (especially Schwerdt, Rebuschat and Andreas) have attended annual election meetings in all 12 party districts. Through their influence, pro-von Thadden or neutral District Executive Committees have been elected in each case. The district officers who led the opposition to the self-dissolution

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of the Berlin NPD last fall have been effectively expelled or neutralized. As of early May, Loyalist influence had been greatly reduced. Although there is now no significant internal opposition group, there was a call pending for formation of an informal group representing both the city organization and the districts to propose organizational changes. Routine monthly district meetings with "guests" from West Germany, whenever possible, are to be continued, under the watchful eye of the pro-tem Executive Committee, until next October when the party convention of the Berlin NPD will elect a new leadership.

13. Schuetz' attempts to have the NPD banned in Berlin have not been taken seriously. Local party activists are preparing to support the NPD election campaign in West Germany by sending volunteer workers. A letter appealing for such help states that the decisive electoral campaign which will determine whether or not the NPD gets into the Bundestag will be waged in North Rhine-Westphalia. Air fare and living expense subsidies are being offered to volunteers who are to distribute leaflets, put up posters and ring doorbells. (Field Comment: The NPD made inroads in North Rhine-Westphalia during the economic recession of 1965-66, and the NPD national leadership is counting heavily on salvaging their foothold in the Bielefeld-Ruhr area.)

14. The main NPD weapons in the national election campaign are to be pamphlets describing the party's election platform. One is to be distributed between 1 and 15 June; a follow-up pamphlet, between 15 and 30 August; and a third pamphlet on the eve of the election. Each will be printed in 15,000,000 copies. Distribution will be handled by two firms--Velbringer Company and Erdmann Company.

15. Ruediger Krauss, head of the NPD's student organization, the National University League (Nationaler Hochschulbund - NHB), has moved from Berlin to Bonn to assume the post of chairman of the Bonn City NPD Executive Committee. Von Thadden plans to use the tactic of moving reliable leaders into critical areas after the elections. For example, he plans to move a Bavarian NPD officer to Berlin and assume the chairmanship of the Berlin NPD. In an attempt to obtain legal recognition for the NHB in Berlin, (fnu) von Hindy, a Hungarian law student and good friend of Krauss, is to be appointed Krauss' successor.

16. Field Dissem: USBER, DCSI/USCOB (Also sent Bonn).

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S E C R E T

West Germany

June 1968

West German Ministry of Interior Evaluation of the Prospects of Banning the National Democratic Party

Germany (1 September 1969) OGA-913

A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had access to the study during his official duties. The information was extracted from the original document and is believed to be an accurate summary of its highlights.

Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the West German National Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given below describes the major charges which the government could bring against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make against these charges, and the probable political results which would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the NPD. According to the source, this study is still considered the basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land) officials. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: For several years, West German political and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court ban on the NPD. On 13 November 1968, Ernst B e n d a, West German Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg K i e s i n g e r that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against the NPD. Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, and the subject became embroiled in West German politics. On 23 April 1969, the Federal Cabinet decided not to seek a court ban of the NPD, at least until after the September elections. This decision was prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains and apparently was losing popular support.)

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2. In June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared a 50-page study of the prospects for banning the NPD entitled "Considerations Regarding a Ban of the National Democratic Party." The study was well prepared and carefully written. It is still considered the basic Interior Ministry paper on the NPD and is being studied by senior officials of both the federal and state governments. It avoids giving an opinion on the prospects of obtaining a court decision against the NPD, but from the content of the study, it is clear that the authors believed that the courts would probably reject a government proposal to ban the NPD. (Field Comment: If the study is still considered current, it is unclear how it fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there was sufficient evidence to obtain a ban against the NPD. There have been other reports, however, that the evidence was not as clear-cut as Benda would have had the Chancellor believe. See, for example, SGN-3894.)

3. The study summarized the case which could be brought against the NPD as follows:

a. It could be shown that there was a similarity between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) which has been outlawed.

b. It could be argued that the goals, and parts of the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the principles of a free democratic state.

The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be presented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without a hearing.

4. The study lists the following points which the NPD could be expected to use in its defense:

a. The party could prove that it has given firm instructions to its members not to engage in [illegible] or violence.

b. It could show that a sizeable number of former NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.

c. It could point out many features of its program which are in accord with democratic principles.

d. It could show that its elected representatives have worked with other parties and have not disrupted the Landtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which they participate.

e. It could point out that other political parties have many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.

f. It would charge that the government's charges were one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.

g. It would claim that not all of Professor (fnu) A n r i c h 's points were included in the party platform. (Field Comment: Anrich is apparently a rightist whose proposals were more extreme than those incorporated in the party platform.)

i. It could claim that the increased violence (Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.

5. The study states that it would be very difficult to refute these NPD defenses in court. The government would have to admit that since early 1968 there have been very few statements made by NPD leaders, or incidents caused by the NPD, which could be used to support the government's case. Objectively, it would have to be admitted that many incidents of violence in which the NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.

6. The study predicts the following probable results should the government win its case against the NPD:

a. The NPD would probably respect the prohibition. It is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to go underground as the illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.

b. NPD members and sympathizers would not change their opinions because of a ban. Many would join other groups or parties and continue to work for their political beliefs.

c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a campaign for the banning of the new German Communist Party (DKP) and other leftist groups.

d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign countries.

7. The study concludes that if the government should lose a case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid evidence (Beweisschwierigkeiten). In such an event, the following adverse affects would occur:

a. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable publicity.

b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some success in keeping former Nazis out of key positions would be halted.

c. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of the stigma of being associated with a party which could be declared illegal, would join the party or become active supporters.

d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members. (Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried because the party's membership has not increased significantly during the past 18 months.)

8. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report

West Germany's National Democrats and the Grand Coalition

Secret

Nº 919

31 May 1968
No. 0022/68A

SECRET

WEST GERMANY'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATS AND THE GRAND COALITION

Germany's far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) showed another increase in strength in recent elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, while the Social Democrats (SPD) lost heavily. This outcome in a traditionally liberal and prosperous state appears to stem in part from the dissatisfaction of many Socialists and trade unionists in the SPD with their party's cabinet cooperation with the Christian Democrats (CDU). Another factor was the discontent of farmers and refugees with the policies of the Grand Coalition in Bonn. Concern over student disorders contributed to the NPD gains, but this was not as decisive as some have supposed. Despite these gains, the NPD is unlikely to achieve a growth comparable to that of the Nazi Party in the early 1930s.


The outcome in Baden-Wuerttemberg confirmed the belief of many Socialists that their cooperation with the CDU at both the national and state level is proving to be unprofitable for the party. As a result, they have already decided at the state level not to renew cabinet cooperation with the CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg, thus making prospects for the Bonn coalition appear less favorable. Nevertheless, SPD leaders in Bonn remain committed to the Grand Coalition and serious instability at the federal level seems unlikely. Over the long run the outcome of this latest election may have certain implications nationally, including the possibility that Bonn leaders may be encouraged to take a more nationalist line.

The NPD's Success

The West German state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg on 28 April brought the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) 9.8 percent of the vote, the most impressive total it has yet attained in any state. About 71 percent of the voters turned out, approximately three percent more than in the last Baden-Wuerttemberg state election in 1964, but 15 percent less than in the 1965 federal election.

Christian Democratic Union (CDU) strength fell slightly to 44.1 percent (1964: 46.2 percent), while the Social Democratic Party (SPD) achieved a vote of only 29.1 percent (1964:

PARTIES IN BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG



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37.3 percent). The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), made a slight gain, winning 14.4 percent of the vote (1964: 13.1 percent). Against the background of last October's Bremen elections, in which the National Democratic Party won what was then a record percentage of 8.9, the Baden-Wuerttemberg results brought renewed cries of alarm over the dangers of neo-Nazism in the Federal Republic. More important, the results also raised doubts as to the future of a coalition government by the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, not only in Baden-Wuerttemberg but at the federal government level as well.

Baden-Wuerttemberg: A Test Case


Baden and Wuerttemberg traditionally have been strongholds of liberal, nonsocialist democracy in Germany. In the early 1930s, the Nazi vote in this area was almost always appreciably lower than elsewhere in Germany. The hotbeds of Nazism lay in other regions, for example in Franconia, East Prussia, and Schleswig-Holstein.

The economic and social picture in Baden-Wuerttemberg would lead to expectations of stability there. The proportion of the population now employed in industry is higher than in any other state. The economy of the state was virtually untouched by the recent West German recession, during which unemployment never exceeded one percent. Per capita income is above average. Protestants and Catholics are almost evenly balanced in population, while the proportion of protestants in the Federal Republic is slightly higher.

A few observers correctly forecast the outcome, but the general expectation was that the vote for the National Democratic Party would be lower than in Bremen. The two major West German polling organizations had predicted in March that the NPD would receive five percent of the vote.

Federal-level politicians had campaigned actively in the state. Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, a popular native son, made a three-day speaking tour, in which he sharply attacked "arrogant, thoughtless, and dangerous nationalism." He stressed this theme in the Hohenlohe area, where the NPD later received its highest vote in the state. Willy Brandt also appeared to speak for the Social Democrats.

NPD Representation in West German States



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The participation by national figures reflected a feeling in Bonn that this state election, the last before the 1969 federal election, might influence national politics. The analogy to the federal scene was pointed up by the existence in Baden-Wuerttemberg of a coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, similar to that in Bonn.

Reaction to Student Riots

In looking for explanations of the NPD gains, German observers have emphasized the public reaction against the Easter student rioting, and dissatisfaction with the federal grand coalition. Conservatives lean to the former explanation, while students and trade unionists stress the latter. The NPD did not receive less than 6 percent in any electoral district. This suggests that the sentiment expressed by the vote is widespread, and may extend throughout the FRG.

Reaction to student rioting probably contributed something, but this aspect seems to have been exaggerated as a factor in NPD gains. In Heidelberg, the NPD vote rose to 11.9 percent, but in three other university towns, the party's vote fell below the state average of 9.8 percent. In industrial Esslingen, where there had been two student riots, the NPD only attained 9 percent. Some voters may have been influenced by student demonstrations to transfer their votes from the SPD to the CDU, whose spokesmen have generally advocated a stern treatment of rioters.

At the same time, the "new left" certainly failed to win popular support. The Democratic Left, supported by radical students, won only 2.3 percent in the state as a whole, while making better showings in certain university and industrial localities. While the Democratic Left's state-wide average was better than the far left had attained in recent elections under other names, it fell below the last, low figure gained by the Communists before they became illegal: 3.2 percent.

Hostility to the Grand Coalition?

There is dissatisfaction with the coalition within the CDU, and it can be assumed that some of the party's right wing voted for the National Democrats. The Socialists, however, suffered the greater loss. Left-of-center Socialists often complain that the party has compromised its principles and lost public favor. There is an undercurrent of feeling in these quarters that the party has endangered German democracy by abandoning its long-time position of opposition and entering into collaboration with the CDU.

Although the SPD has provided much of the impetus to the grand coalition's economic and foreign policies, and although the coalition in Baden-Wuerttemberg has generally functioned well, dissatisfaction undoubtedly exists among idealistic members of the left and among traditionally class-conscious union members. Middle class voters of this persuasion probably turned

to the Free Democratic Party, which has assumed the role of respectable opposition. The connection between this left-liberal criticism and the NPD gains on 28 April is not immediately apparent.

Some commentators including some Socialists, conclude that many SPD voters defected to the NPD. The respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung fudged some of the election data to support its argument that workers had gone over to the NPD, but a more careful analysis has shown that the NPD did indeed win above-average support in some working-class neighborhoods.

Many old Socialists and trade unionists, such as Willi Bleicher, the powerful boss of the metalworkers in this state, are cool to the coalition and hostile to intellectuals, and some of them are repelled by anarchic student leftism. Even so, most workers are unlikely under conditions of full employment to cast what they would consider a neo-Nazi vote; certainly Bleicher would never favor such action. SPD electoral losses would seem to be due less to defection to the NPD than to the failure of lower-level SPD functionaries, apathetic, or even hostile toward the coalition, to get out the vote, and to the failure of many trade union and normally SPD voters to go to the polls.

In traditionally socialist Mannheim, only 58 percent of those entitled to vote turned out. SPD percentages dropped 14 percent in one district and 13 percent in another. The percentage of NPD strength rose to 12.1, 10.9, and 11.2 in the three city districts, but working class votes would not be needed to provide these percentages, especially in the face of a low SPD turnout. These votes probably came mainly from the CDU, the FDP, or from those who had not voted before.

NPD Activity Pays Off

The NPD organization worked hard during the campaign, conducting more meetings than all the other parties put together. The party has overcome its former inexperience and disunity, and is developing into a well-oiled political machine. The organization fields speakers and provides canned speeches and propaganda materials to local groups. The NPD's heritage is not purely Nazi. It encompasses more respectable antecedents, such as the Deutschnationaler (German Nationalists) and other conservative elements. In the interests of avoiding a government ban, the National Democratic Party shuns blatantly Nazi appeals and tactics.

Adolf von Thadden, the national leader of the NPD, is a smooth personality from a Junker family who denies charges that he was an active Nazi. He seems to model himself more on De Gaulle than on Hitler. The Baden-Wuerttemberg leader of the party, Wilhelm Gutmann, is a former Nazi. During "the good old days," he was Buergermeister of Tiengen on the Swiss border, where he sponsored anti-Semitic

activities in 1938. He refused to permit the raising of white flags when the Allied forces arrived in 1945. Despite his past, he won 15,000 votes in Karlsruhe. In one commune in the northern end of the state, the NPD gained an absolute majority with 55 percent of the vote; this was the home of an NPD candidate named Valentin Goetz, who had been voted out as Buergermeister two years before.

The NPD won its greatest relative successes in three northern districts: Oehringen (14.8 percent), Crailsheim (14.5 percent), and Tauberbischofsheim (14.3 percent). The first two of these districts are largely protestant; the latter is predominantly Catholic. This northern area, and especially its Hohenlohe section, is filled with dissatisfied small farmers, who now face Common Market competition and who have recently suffered the loss of a state subsidy on milk. Rural dissatisfaction provides opportunities for the NPD, but this is not a promising base for a mass movement, particularly since the farm population in the Federal Republic has dropped in the last ten years from 20 percent to 11 percent. Another important voting factor in this northern area is the relatively high proportion of refugees, who were probably aroused by recent statements by Willy Brandt about the Oder-Neisse line and by the failure of the CDU to react more forcefully against Brandt.

As was the case in the early 1930s, overwhelmingly Catholic areas, where the Church influences its members politically, had the lowest right extremist vote. One overwhelmingly Protestant district, Freudenstadt, also produced a


ADOLF VON THADDEN


WILHELM GUTMANN

low NPD vote. A postelection poll of 1967 voters in Bremen showed that, unlike the Hitler movement, the National Democrats do not yet attract many women and youth. More than two thirds of the voters for the party were males, and the strongest participation was in the 45 to 60 age bracket.

FDP Gains and Losses

The FDP profited from its position in the opposition. Ralf Dahrendorf, a sociologist from the University of Konstanz with an international reputation, has recently entered the party and has assumed a leading role, influencing the FDP in a leftward direction and attracting left-liberal support. In the Stuttgart district where he was a candidate, the party vote rose by 6 percent. On the other hand, the new pattern is not acceptable to many old members of this traditionally business-oriented party, who looking askance at Dahrendorf's readiness to debate and discuss with Rudi Dutschke and other radical students. Two of the three districts with heaviest NPD gains also showed heavy FDP losses, as did some other former FDP areas of strength.

Perspectives on the Vote

The over-all picture appears to be that while both the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats lost to the NPD, they gained at the expense of the Socialists. The Socialists suffered from apathy and incurred some loss to both the NPD and Democratic Left. The NPD probably garnered some new and uncommitted votes. It is fortunate for the SPD leaders in Bonn that the annual party congress came before the Baden-Wuerttemberg election. It is hardly likely that the congress would now defeat a motion withholding endorsement of the coalition, as it did by a four-vote margin in March. Assuming the SPD remains faithful to the Bonn coalition now, the prospects are for further erosion of its strength and for greater difficulties within its ranks.

Meanwhile, the NPD probably will continue to grow in influence. It now is probably stronger in some other areas than in Baden-Wuerttemberg. A change from proportional representation to single-member constituencies, which might have



served to block NPD growth, has now become even less acceptable than before to the SPD, which would have lost three-fifths of its Baden-Wuerttemberg seats under this system.

A ban of the NPD appears unlikely unless the party commits some flagrant violation of accepted rules. A Bonn press office spokesman has stated that the government will seek a political debate with the NPD, and not a ban. On present form, the NPD may get 40 seats in the 1969 Bundestag elections. An attempt to set a higher minimum percentage of votes (present minimum: five percent) for Bundestag representation would arouse violent FPD opposition, and does not seem to be under serious consideration at the moment. It would violate German tradition, and might produce a reaction in favor of the NPD, enabling it to overstep even the new margin.

Although the growth of the NPD is disturbing, alarm does not seem to be warranted. In the early 1930s, Germany suffered from depression and high unemployment, and had bitter memories of a recent inflation which wiped out savings. Powerful elements in the government and society, including President von Hindenberg, the army, the courts, and heavy industry, were highly reactionary and either cool or hostile to republican democracy--as were the professors and students. Racism was rampant and more or less respectable, and unwillingness to accept defeat in World War I provided endless opportunities for demagoguery. All these conditions are now virtually absent. The defeat in 1945, and subsequent disclosures, work to discredit any real Nazi manifestations. Moreover, the fact that no other state will elect a new assembly before the 1969 federal elections may help to prevent a real bandwagon development. It must be emphasized that the NPD is still a small party, if no longer a mere splinter group.

The Coalition Problem

German observers tend to be more worried about the effect of the NPD showing on foreign opinion than about the increase in NPD strength itself, and their greatest concern is over the prospects for the grand coalition, resulting from the SPD losses. A Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD convention voted on 18 May against continuing the coalition in Stuttgart, and the old state SPD leaders resigned. This would seem to make the prospects for the Bonn coalition less favorable.

At the same time, the FDP appears not to be in a mood to return to a coalition in either Bonn or Stuttgart. Dahrendorf has suggested that there might be a CDU minority government in the state. State CDU leaders may, however, prefer to call new elections if a coalition cannot be formed. In this event, they would appeal for an absolute majority from the voters. If they got it and if the NPD vote declined, this would be encouraging, but new elections might also have a less favorable outcome.

If the 1969 federal election follows the pattern of the 28 April election, the same problems will arise in Bonn. With this kind of a breakdown of the vote, the FDP and the SPD together cannot form a majority, and a refusal on the part of both of them to join the CDU means that the latter cannot organize a majority government either--unless the CDU invites NPD collaboration, which it is far from ready to do.

A collapse of the grand coalition in Bonn either before or after 1969 and a return by the SPD to opposition positions would signify more than a passing cabinet crisis. In the past, parties tended to harden into intransigence, committed to particular ideological and material interests, and unable to reach pragmatic compromises with each other. In recent years, West German politicians have tried to break with this tradition and to work on the consensus principle. A failure of these efforts would have serious implications. If--as does not seem likely at present--the three major parties were unable to form a majority government, this might lead to severe instability and the discrediting of parliamentary government.

Bonn and Weimar

Many misleading analogies have been drawn between the Bonn and Weimar republics. One Weimar precedent may help, however, to explain why some observers view the coalition problem seriously. In March 1930, another grand coalition with SPD participation collapsed over the question of cuts in unemployment insurance, leading to the formation of a conservative majority government under Heinrich Bruening. Bruening was later replaced by the reactionary Franz von Papen, who in turn was followed first by a wire-pulling general, Kurt von Schleicher, and then by Adolf Hitler. The worst aspect of the SPD withdrawal was that it made the parliament ineffective and powerless.

Once minority government was embarked on, supported by presidential prerogatives, there was no effective test for legitimacy except the will of Hindenburg by then susceptible and old. The Nazis ultimately came to power, not by a majority vote, but through the paralysis and impotence of the constitutional system and through intrigues in the presidential palace on the part of those, especially Papen and Schleicher, who thought they could "use" Nazi mass support.

In contrast to the 30s, the presidential powers now are far weaker,* and aside from all the other factors inhibiting a recurrence, the Weimar precedent itself must influence SPD leaders in Bonn. They are completely committed personally to the present coalition. A decision to go into opposition is unlikely under Brandt and Wehner.

The absence of executive emergency powers is not of course without dangers. In a bitter parliamentary deadlock, an illegal assumption of power, perhaps by extragovernmental elements, might be the only way out.

Another possibility might be a left-wing withdrawal from the SPD, although the leadership for a dissident faction has yet to emerge. This might provide a healthy outlet for criticism of the system without a turn to minority rule. Unlike the early 1930s, virtually all West German politicians now would do their best to maintain a functioning constitutional system. Real dangers will probably not arise unless, as in the late Weimar period, the government finds itself confronted with economic or political problems which seem to defy compromise settlement or rational solution.

Immediate Prospects

Assuming that the Bonn coalition lasts until the 1969 elections, its leading members may still modify their policies somewhat in the light of the Baden-Wuerttemberg experience. The adverse vote of the refugees in the recent election could act as a brake on the policy of detente with Czechoslovakia and Poland, although there is no sign of this as yet. Chancellor Kiesinger has attributed NPD gains partly to "years of agitation against our own history and against healthy self-confidence," which suggests that he may try to sound a more nationalistic note. To the extent to which the results continue to be attributed to student activities, this will strengthen the demand for firmness. Even before the election, Brandt sent a telegram to SPD state headquarters, advising that speakers should react "completely hard" against student demonstrations.

Although the antistudent reaction does not seem to have been as important a factor as some have believed it to be, constant violence and provocation on the part of the students, accompanied by constant press attention, could lead to severe official or unofficial counteraction. This, in turn, could bring more serious student violence, perhaps with the support of other elements.

Some matters of student concern have appeal for others. Thus students and many trade unionists oppose emergency laws, and this question is again being agitated. Because of the Nazi experience, there is widespread aversion among left-of-center elements to the use of force in the name of "order," however great the provocation. But also because of the Nazi experience, a really large increase in NPD votes does not seem likely in the 1969 election, or in an earlier new election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, should that come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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SCORE CARD

1. Bundestag Elections 1965 — NPD's first Effort	664,157 votes = 2%
2. 13 March 1966, communal Elections, Schleswig-Holstein. (NPD has directive not to participate. A few did)	In 11 communities where NPD ran candidates, averaged 10.5% of vote compared with 6% in same towns in 1965.
3. 13 March 1966, Bavarian Communal Elections NPD major effort concentrated only in Franconia.	1.6 % of total Bavarian vote but: Middle Franconia = 5.. Ansbach - 5.1% Erlangen - 3.2% Nurnberg - 7.3% Schwabach - 5.6% Upper Franconia Bayreuth - 8.4% Coburg - 5.3% Kulmbach - 5.8% 3 + 2 village mayors
4. 27 March 1966 Hamburg Burgerschaft Election	3.9 % (1.8% in 1965) no candidates elected
5. 10 July 1966 Northrhein-Westphalia Landtag Election No NPD candidates elected none entered.	
6. 16 October 1966 Hamlin Byelection (Communal Concil)	8.8% (1965=) 2 seats
7. 6 November 1966 Hesse Landtag Elections	[illegible] votes = 7.9%+ 8 Seats in Landtag Marburg, Wiesbaden, Darmst. and Giessen = ca 10% Ff/M = 8.4%
7. 20 November 1966 Bavarian Landtag Elections	votes = 7.4% 15 Seats in Landtag
8. 23 April 1967 Rheinland-Palatine	4 Seats, 6.9 % of vote
9. 23 April 1967 Schleswig-Holstein	4 Seats, 5.7 % of vote
10. 4 June 1967 Lower Saxony	10 Seats, 7 % of vote
11. 11 October 1967 Bremen Burgerschaft	8 Seats, 8.8 % of vote
12. 28 April 1968 Baden-Wuerttemberg	12 Seats, 9.8 % of vote

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

The National Democratic Party in West Germany

Special Report

WEEKLY REVIEW

Secret

№ 310

9 June 1967

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THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN WEST GERMANY


The poor showing of the ultranationalistic National Democratic Party (NPD) in recent elections in several West German states clearly disproves the party's claim of providing an acceptable alternative to the policies and programs of the country's major parties. The NPD's failure to maintain the momentum suggested by the successes scored in two state elections last fall is directly attributable both to its own well-publicized internal dissension and to voter preference for the Christian Democrats and Socialists deriving from the image of vigor and decisiveness imparted by their "grand coalition" under Chancellor Kiesinger. Barring some serious reversal in the fortunes of the Kiesinger government--which is unlikely--it is doubtful that the NPD will be any more successful than other fringe groups have been in seeking to rally latent right-radical sentiment in Germany and revive it as a dynamic political force.

Election Setbacks

The NPD has claimed wide attention both in Germany and abroad and led many observers to conclude that it was a force to be reckoned with. Within two and a half years of its founding in November 1964, the party elected representatives to the legislatures in five of West Germany's ten states (11 counting West Berlin). In elections this April the party was expected to obtain close to 10 percent of the vote in Rhineland-Palatinate and 12 to 15 percent in Schleswig-Holstein but actually won only four seats in each parliament with 6.9 and 5.8 percent of the vote respectively. In the 4 June election in the party's "home base bastion" of Lower Saxony, the NPD's performance was similarly unimpressive--7 percent of the vote and 10 Landtag seats.

Emphasis by party leaders on their success in gaining representation in all the states where the party has competed during the past year has not masked their disappointment that the NPD's momentum of growth has leveled off. The party's failure to make a good showing in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony--areas considered particularly susceptible to nationalist appeals--is especially damaging, and raises fundamental doubt about the party's future prospects.

NPD Representation in West German States



Origins and Early Successes

Formed from the remnants of the defunct German Reich Party (DRP)--one of a number of ultranationalistic splinter groups which have dotted the political landscape of postwar Germany--the NPD quickly established a political apparatus capable of functioning throughout the country. The new party soon distinguished itself by its relative success in attracting the support of other ultranationalistic elements and a variety of political malcontents. Earlier attempts by other groups to unite disparate nationalists invariably had foundered on personal rivalries and tactical disagreements. Some were no more than platforms for self-expression by leaders advocating a particular set of extremist notions. Even the most successful, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), which at its high water mark obtained 11 percent of the vote in the Lower Saxony Landtag elections in 1951, was unable to establish effective working relations with rival rightist groups before it was outlawed by the West German supreme court in 1952.

During its first year, the NPD encountered many of the problems experienced by its predecessors. The party was unable to put on an effective campaign for the September 1965 national elections and obtained only 2 percent of the votes--short of the 5-percent minimum required for representation in the Bundestag. In local elections in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein in March 1966, however, the NPD showed that it could command pockets of strength. In the Bavarian cities of Nuremberg and Bayreuth, it received between 7 and 10 percent of the vote and elected representatives to the local governing councils. These gains were facilitated by concentrating the party's efforts in selected areas such as the Protestant centers of Middle and Upper Franconia in heavily Catholic Bavaria.

The first clear demonstration that the NPD could attract more than the ultranationalist vote came two weeks later in Hamburg, where the party nearly doubled its vote as compared with the Bundestag election the year before. Although the NPD failed to elect any deputies, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists were concerned about its ability to secure even 3.9 percent of the vote. The threat to the traditional third party, the conservative Free Democrats (FDP) became apparent. The FDP fell a third below its 1965 vote and lost 4 of its 12 seats in the Hamburg city council. Profiting from a decline in the economy which was already under way and the increasing public disenchantment with the leadership of then Chancellor Erhard in Bonn, the NPD accelerated both its organizational effort and its public relations campaign.

The stage was then set for the party's breakthrough in the Hesse and Bavaria state elections

last fall in which it won 7.9 and 7.4 percent of the vote and elected 8 and 15 deputies respectively. In Bavaria the NPD emerged as the only small party in the Landtag, causing the FDP to lose its representation in the legislature for the first time in its history. By underlining the weakness of the FDP, the election outcome contributed to the formation of the grand coalition government in Bonn by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists.

For the major parties, the NPD's successes had disturbing implications. In contrast to its various predecessors, the NPD appeared capable of mobilizing urban as well as rural support and of altering the general trend long evident in most West German elections toward a two-party system. In Hesse, the combined vote of the Christian Democrats and Socialists was a lower percentage of the total vote than in the previous election four years earlier. Still more significantly, however, Hesse and Bavaria provided further evidence of the NPD's ability to attract "protest" votes from various disaffected lower-middle-class elements including small businessmen and farmers unhappy with their lot in present-day Germany.

Basic Characteristics and Sources of Support

In spite of its direct lineage from the old German Reich Party, the NPD has tried to dispel the impression among the general public that it is the spiritual heir of Hitler's National Socialists. The party has sought acceptance as a legitimate political party and insists that it intends to function within the established democratic order. Party spokesmen maintain that it differs from the established parties primarily in its allegedly superior devotion to the national interest, which they accuse the governing parties in Bonn of having failed to protect. The NPD says it offers the voter a genuine choice between bankrupt policies of the major parties and a return to national morality.


As much as some NPD supporters might wish to play down the party's Nazi associations, however, it has been clearly established that the leadership consists of a nucleus of former Nazis who have been active in neo-Nazi parties throughout the postwar years. According to police reports, some 2,000 of the estimated 25,000 members of the NPD belonged to the Nazi party before 1933. This ratio is roughly eight times that for the public as a whole. The party has lost libel suits in which it has challenged charges of neo-Nazism. The German Interior Ministry notes the parallels in political outlook and philosophy between the NPD and the Nazis, and maintains that the party's activities "approach" unconstitutionality. In the words of one former party member, the NPD is made up of people "who have forgotten nothing and learned nothing" from Germany's past.

The Bonn government is generally reluctant, however, to ban the NPD, believing that it would be imprudent to drive the ultra-rightists underground. If the NPD were to score impressive new successes in future elections, however, the resulting concern in the major parties might prompt a reconsideration of this policy. Interior Minister Luecke favors banning the party as soon as enough evidence can be obtained to assure successful court action. It is also possible that new NPD gains would motivate the established parties to make proposed changes in the electoral law that would make it more difficult for the NPD to obtain Bundestag representation.

Although the NPD program is strongly reminiscent of Hitlerian National Socialism, the party's electoral supporters in Hesse and Bavaria also include persons who have no prior Nazi affiliations or any particular susceptibility to Nazism per se. It has managed to attract impulsive youngsters, as well as political malcontents of all ages. Its membership includes individuals from a broad range of occupations. The NPD's special appeal among the lower-middle-class, and particularly among the small businessmen and farmers is reinforced by the economic squeeze these groups are experiencing as a result of government economy measures. In Hesse and Bavaria, the party did especially well in areas noted for traditional German nationalism and in areas which are predominantly Protestant. Many NPD adherents are expellees from the territories lost at the end of World War II.

The makeup of the formal NPD membership is not radically different in age or occupation group from a cross section of the general public. However, there are certain characteristics of NPD supporters which set them apart from supporters of the three major parties. The NPD tends to attract a somewhat larger number of older persons as well as young adults, and the number of lower middle class members, including pensioners, is disproportionately large. Formal membership among students, however, is very small and only 350 of a total of 244,000 university students are on the party rolls.

There is no evidence that the NPD receives significant financial support from German industrialists. It is, however, able to operate in the black. The sound state of its finances is in part a result of its practice of charging admission to its rallies. This serves the double function of making the rank and file feel that they have a stake in the party and of making it necessary for its opponents to pay for the right to heckle. The party also derives considerable sums from membership dues, subscriptions to party publications, and donations from members and sympathizers.



Party leader Von Thadden at Second NPD Congress at Karlsruhe, June 1966



NPD audience: a characteristic cross section

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Rumors of clandestine financial support from the Communists or from sympathizers among Nazi emigrants to Latin America have not been confirmed.

Despite NPD claims of widespread sympathy in the West German armed forces, there is no evidence of this. German security officials estimate that no more than 2 percent of armed forces members are card-carrying NPD members. Since the NPD is a legal political organization, military leaders are constrained from openly influencing members of the armed forces to oppose it.

Many Germans are probably reluctant openly to admit their support for an organization like the NPD. It is significant, however, that only 6 percent of respondents to a national opinion poll in January 1967 indicated a preference for the NPD.

Leadership Problems

The most notable single handicap confronting the NPD is the weakness of its leadership. None of its leaders possesses any great talent or stature. Certainly no individual with Hitler's demagogic genius has yet appeared. The absence of strong leadership in what has been called a "fuehrer-oriented party" has left it divided and weakened by factionalism. This was clearly demonstrated in March 1967 when then party chairman Fritz Thielen and Deputy Chairman Adolf von Thadden engaged in a public feud which further damaged the party's reputation. An outgrowth of longstanding personal antagonism, the dispute was triggered by Thielen's resistance to Von Thadden's attempted take-over as party chairman in Lower Saxony. Thielen claimed that Von Thadden's election to the state chairmanship had been illegal and would hurt the party's reputation. The party's federal executive, however, turned the tables on Thielen and not only voted to reinstate Von Thadden but also to drop Thielen from the national chairmanship and expel him from the party. Thielen clung to the helm under a temporary court order until finally throwing in the sponge in early May with an announcement of his formation of a new, rival party, the National Peoples Party (NVP).

More of an archconservative than a neo-Nazi, Thielen was never more than a figurehead. Real authority and leadership--as well as ideological guidance--was provided by Von Thadden. Von Thadden is a 45-year-old native of Pomerania, a member of a prominent and aristocratic Prussian family, a number of whose members were prominent in the anti-Nazi resistance. Although Von Thadden applied for Nazi party membership he apparently was never formally admitted. An ardent nationalist, Von Thadden aspires to become a German De Gaulle rather than a re-creator of the German Reich.

Other leaders of some prominence include Otto Hess, party propaganda chief, and Waldemar Schuetz, editor of the NPD's

official weekly, Deutsche Nachrichten. Both were active Nazis.

Thielen's departure clears the way for Von Thadden formally to take over leadership of the NPD. It is doubtful that Thielen has the personal force or following to organize a party with significant strength. The impact of the new party on the NPD will probably be small since the bulk of the NPD membership appears to prefer the leadership and ideology of the Von Thadden group. On the other hand, the strengthening of extremist tendencies within the NPD signaled by the triumph of Von Thadden may hurt the party's interests in the long run. The result is also likely to assist those actively seeking a formal government crackdown on the party.

Program

In addition to its leadership difficulties, another failing of the NPD is its inability as yet to offer a clear, positive program relevant to existing problems. Xenophobic and opportunistic, the NPD feeds upon nostalgia for an older German nationalism, discontent with the existing social order, and Germany's international standing and frustration over the fact that reunification remains as distant a prospect as ever. Its stated objectives are ill defined, when not deliberately ambiguous, and are sometimes inconsistent. Its electoral approach is generally negative and destructively critical rather than affirmative. Its principal targets include foreign interests and culture which undermine old values and "de-Germanize the fatherland." It attacks the renunciation by those in power of what the NPD regards as justified German objectives. It deplores what it considers the miseducation and corruption of youth, "crime in the streets," foreign aid, and the competition of foreign workers.

The NPD demands an end to German dependence on the US and calls for the revival of German national consciousness. It attempts to draw a parallel between West German - US relations and those between the East German regime and the USSR. In order to free Germany from foreign domination, NPD spokesmen maintain, American "occupation" forces must go, although not before the withdrawal of Russian troops, which the NPD would have occur simultaneously with that of US troops. Germany must again become master of its own fate, party leaders insist, and the "lie" of war guilt and war crimes trials must be ended and a new German general staff created. A key demand is that the reunification of Germany cannot be limited to uniting West and East Germany but must include the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse border now held by Poland. Although it does not advocate the use of force to achieve this objective, the party holds out hope that recovery will be possible by a Machiavellian deal of some sort. NPD spokesmen at present renounce a national nuclear capability for Germany.

The party puts forth slogans proclaiming "Germany for the Germans" and "Europe for the Europeans." Indeed, the NPD favors a united Europe somewhat along the lines advocated by De Gaulle. Europe, it holds, should be completely independent of the US, and possess its own nuclear deterrent. It should be built on a Franco-German alliance that smaller European countries sooner or later would have to join. The NPD would welcome the decay of NATO as signaling the end of sterile policies which do not serve Germany's real interests.

In seeking to gain the broadest popular acceptance, the party avoids affirming the more extreme aspects of Nazi ideology. There is, for example, no obvious anti-Semitism in the party program and Jews technically could become party members. The private attitudes of the leadership, however, are said to resemble traditional Nazi anti-Semitism closely. The NPD makes vague references, moreover, to the importance of "blood ties," rejects evidence relating to the Nazi extermination policy, makes derogatory references to the Jews in the party press, and denounces aid to Israel.

In recent campaigning in Lower Saxony, NPD spokesmen shifted tactics somewhat by no longer stressing issues obviously associated with the Nazi period such as war guilt and reparations. Instead, they sought to exploit current grievances including the economic recession, unemployment, lack of progress on reunification, and what they called the unreliability of NATO.

Future Prospects

The NPD's failure to maintain the momentum of last fall's successes in this year's state elections in Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony is a serious blow to the party's hopes. The squabble among the leadership apparently reinforced the feeling among uncommitted elements that casting a protest vote for the NPD was not worthwhile under present circumstances. The widespread discontent among farmers over government economy measures did not result in a significant shift of votes to the NPD. Moreover, there has been a strong resurgence of general confidence in the Bonn government. Although the NPD benefited last fall from the popular dissatisfaction with the Erhard government, the grand coalition headed by CDU Chancellor Kiesinger has displayed vigor and decisiveness which has been rewarded at the polls.

Even if the NPD were to follow its forerunners into oblivion it would not mark the end of rightist extremism. A portion of the German electorate will remain receptive to this kind of appeal. In the absence of a party such as the NPD, right-wing voters tend to give their support to one of the insignificant splinter parties, or to one of the more conservative established parties, such as the FDP, when they vote at all.

It is possible--although increasingly unlikely--that the NPD could turn out to resemble other parties of a national-conservative stamp. Despite the radical views of some of their members, such groups have managed to operate without subversive manifestations. The German Party (DP), for example, which had been represented in several North German state legislatures and in the Bundestag conducted itself in a responsible fashion.

The NPD at present draws a good deal of this traditional right-wing vote from the old Refugee Party, the DP, and small conservative regional parties such as the Bavarian Party. The total extremist vote, however, has increased very little since the establishment of the NPD. Estimates of the extent of hard-core ultranationalist sentiment in Germany vary between 5 and 15 percent of the electorate. Under present conditions this does not constitute a threat to German democratic institutions and is not greater than the degree of extremist sentiment in other Western European countries.

Outlook

Assuming the NPD survives the current period of internal strife, its potential for further growth beyond its present 6- to 8-percent range appears to be limited under conditions now prevailing in West Germany. The NPD is still capable of capitalizing on circumstances which might present themselves as a result of a protracted economic recession or major political blunders which would discredit the present government leadership. The outcome of recent state elections, however, tends to confirm that the overwhelming majority of German voters continues to prefer the moderate, albeit increasingly independent and nationalist, policies of the major parties and the government, and rejects the radical alternatives advocated by the NPD. (SECRET)

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	West Germany	REPORT NO.	CS DB-312/00003-67
SUBJECT	BfV Program to Monitor and Counter the Activities of the National Democratic Party	DATE DISTR.	5 JAN 1967
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	23 November 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Germany, Bonn (25 November 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A qualified American official from a senior official of the West German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). This official is responsible for monitoring the activities of right radical organizations throughout West Germany. The information is probably true.

1. (Summary: The West German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and its regional affiliates (LfV) have undertaken a program to monitor and counter the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD). Included in this program are efforts to penetrate the NPD at all its levels, to monitor its membership and finances, and to counter its influence.)

2. Report: For a number of years the BfV has been engaged in penetrating and monitoring the activities of right radical organizations. Since the establishment of the NPD in [illegible] ago, 1964, the BfV has made a concerted effort to penetrate it at both the national and regional levels. This effort has resulted in the recruitment of about 60 sources with access to the NPD organizations at all levels. In several cases the BfV or LfV have been able to recruit local NPD county chairmen and in six Laender have access to the minutes and files of the Land organizations. The BfV has also penetrated the national headquarters of the NPD in Hannover.

3. Through its penetration of the national organization, the BfV has been able to obtain and photograph the entire membership rolls, which currently contain about 20,000 names. The national list has been augmented by additional membership applications obtained via penetrations of the [illegible] Land organizations. The BfV is currently in the process of tracing all of these membership applications against the master Nazi Party membership files at the American

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

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controlled Berlin Document Center. Although this tracing activity has not been completed and is handicapped by lack of personnel at the Berlin Document Center, the BfV estimates its current file on the NPD is far more accurate than the files at the NPD headquarters. Because of its access to the Berlin Document Center, the BfV will eventually have a better estimate of the number of NPD members who are former Nazi Party members than does the NPD itself.

4. The BfV is also making a concerted effort to obtain documentary evidence on the NPD's sources of income. The recruitment efforts to do this are directed at spotting and recruiting clerical help who work in NPD offices and have access to files. Information in the BfV's possession to date, which includes considerable documentary evidence regarding finances, indicates that the party is not receiving any substantial financial assistance from abroad. The principal sources of funds are as follows:

a. The monthly DM 3.- membership dues. For the 20,000 members, this amounts to DM 60,000 per month or DM 720,000 a year.

b. Subscription fees for publications.

c. Single donations from financially well-to-do members and supporters.

d. Admission fees for political rallies. The BfV has registered, since May 1966 when the NPD began its campaign in Bavaria, a total of more than 2000 political rallies in Bavaria. Although at times more than one third of those attending such rallies were estimated to be opposed to the NPD, everyone attending the rally paid an admission fee. The BfV estimates that the NPD has been able through the above sources of income to collect from DM 3,000,000 to DM 4,000,000. The LfV are watching this funding quite closely, particularly for evidence of financing from Communist countries. Thus far they have been unable to substantiate the existence of any such support. Although there is no firm evidence of actual financial support of the NPD from Communist sources, the BfV is aware of an interest on the part of the Eastern intelligence services to penetrate the NPD and monitor its activities.

5. At the instigation of Federal Minister of Interior Luecke, the BfV has undertaken to establish a confidential all-party committee consisting of members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Trade Union Movement (DGB) to counter the NPD in Rheinland-Pfalz prior to the upcoming elections in spring 1967. All of the parties have agreed to participate and this activity is moving ahead. Recently at a two-day conference chaired by the BfV in a village on the Mosel River, it was decided not only to counteract NPD propaganda during the election campaign, but also to undertake orientation lectures for all officials in the Rheinland-Pfalz and other local governments who have shown NPD leanings. These courses will be launched as soon as the campaign gets underway. A similar propaganda and orientation activity is also being planned for the elections in Schleswig-Holstein in 1967.

6. The BfV has persuaded the DGB to set up an action group aimed at organizing the Labor movement into countering the

influence of the NPD. The BfV is assisting the DGB in working out methods for the infiltration of workers into NPD organizations to report and counteract their influence within factories and workers councils. The BfV has also established contact with the German Industrial Institute in Cologne, which is sponsored by the German equivalent of the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers. The BfV used as an argument with the industrialists the fact that increasing influence of the NPD in German industry would have a negative effect upon foreign trade.

7. The BfV undertook a survey of the election results at the village and county level in Land Hesse. This survey showed that the NPD had substantial success in areas containing German military installations. It was further determined that the NPD had considerable appeal among non-commissioned professional soldiers who feel they have failed to find acceptance in the postwar German society. This negative attitude has been less among Bundeswehr officers and draftees than among non-commissioned officers, who feel themselves underpaid and lacking in social acceptance. The BfV has contacted the security organizations of the Bundeswehr to undertake a program of orientation to counter the influence of the NPD within the Bundeswehr.

Headquarters Comment: CS-311/16288-66 from a different source reported that the President of the West German Association of Military Reservists had stated that a large percentage of older reserve officers and non-commissioned officers had voted for the NPD in the Land Hesse election.

Anlage 1

Stellenbesetzung des Bundesparteivorstandes der NPD

(Stand: 1.10.1966)

Parteivorsitzender:

THIELEN, Friedrich (Fritz) geb. 25.9.16 in Bremen,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Schönebeck, Brauteichen 19
Beruf: Betonfabrikant

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründungsmitglied der CDU,
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften,
1957 Mitglied und später Landesvorsitzender der "Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

1. Stellvertreter:

GUTMANN, Wilhelm, geb. 9.6.1900 in Basel,
wohnhaft: Karlsruhe, Kaiserallee 30
Beruf: Angestellter

1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Baden-Württemberg der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
"Gesamtdeutsche Partei" (GDP/BHE),
ehem. Funktionär des "Bundesverbandes ehem. Internierter- und Entnazifizierungsgeschädigter" (BIE).

NSDAP: 1.3.1932
1933 Bürgermeister in Tiengen

von THADDEN, Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,
wohnhaft: Benthe, Lärchenweg 6
Beruf: Chefredakteur

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1949 Mitglied der "Deutschen Rechts-Partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion "Nationale Rechte",
1950 Mitgl. u. Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei"(DRP),
1955-1959 Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages.

NSDAP: 1.9.1939

WINTER, Franz Florian, geb. 23.3.1923 in Amberg,
wohnhaft: Tegernsee, Bahnhofstr. 11
Beruf: Metzgermeister u. Fachredakteur

1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
CSU-Mitglied u. Mitglied der Landesleitung
GDP-Mitglied u. Mitglied des Vorstandes des Landesausschusses und des Kreisverbandes

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

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III. Präsidium:

BROUWER, Otto Theodor, geb. 31.5.1906 in Paris,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Vegesack, Gerhard-Rohlfs-Str. 61,
Beruf: Kaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bremen der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
"Deutsche Partei" (DP),
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaft

NSDAP: 1.8.1931

HESS, Otto, geb. 19.12.1908 in Rossdorf,
wohnhaft: Bissendorf, Weidendamm,
Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann,

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied u. Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1938 Referent im Berichts- und R echtsamt der
obersten SA-Führung, SA-Obersturmbannführer.

LANKER, Dr. Karl, geb. 22.9.1913 in Theesen,
wohnhaft: Bielefeld, Paderborner Weg 24 a
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Notar

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Nordrhein-Westf.d.NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NADAP: 1.5.1933

SCHÜTZ, Waldemar, geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,
wohnhaft: Göttingen, Felix-Klein-Str. 4
Beruf: Schriftleiter u. Verlagsinhaber

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.11.1936,
1929 Eintritt in die HJ,
1934 Adjutant des Gau-Pressechefs,
1937 Kreiswart u. Gaureferent "Kraft durch
Freude" (KdF),
1938-1939 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,
anschließend Beauftragter der NSDAP im Gau Hessen,
SS-Hauptsturmführer der Waffen-SS

SCHWEIMER, Horst-Günther, geb. 11.2.1913 in Essen,
wohnhaft: Hamburg-Groß-Flottbek, Hochrad 7,
Beruf: Reedereibesitzer

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hamburg der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: 1.4.1932
SS-Hauptsturmführer und Adjutant
Legationsrat im Auswärtigen Amt

[illegible], geb. [illegible] in Berlin,
wohnhaft: Vlotho/Weser, Hochstr. 6,
Beruf: Dipl. Politologe

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied der CDU, des [illegible], der GVP und der NE-Freunde.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

WINKELMANN, Fritz, geb. 21.5.1909 in Wittingen/Krs.Gifhorn
wohnhaft: Wittingen, Stackmannstr. 4
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Notar

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied der "Deutschen Partei" (DP) und
Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

IV. Parteivorstand:

a) gewählte Mitglieder:

BRANDES, Anneliese, geb. 7.10.07 in Hargarten/Lothringen
wohnhaft: Herzberg, Enzianstr. 7

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionar

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

LAUER, Peter, geb. 30.11.1940 in Löhnhorst,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Auf dem Lärchenberge 15,
Beruf: Student

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

MA[illegible]DORN, E[illegible]l, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
wohnhaft: Großaitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionar

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)
1936 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben
1937 Reichsschulungsleiter im Amt für Technik,München.

PRINZ zu SALM, Karl, geb. 8.11.1911 in Coesfeld,
wohnhaft: Breitscheid ü.Düsseld., Kahlenbergweg 7
Beruf: Kaufmann/Oberst a.D.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

- 4 -

WINKELVOSS, Gertraud, geb. 18.2.1917 in Prettin,
wohnhaft: Lüneburg, In der Techt 1
Beruf: Hausfrau

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründerin und Leiterin des "Deutschen Kinderschutzbundes" Oldenburg
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.9.1938

b) Sonstige Angehörige des Parteivorstandes:

JAAG, Adolf, geb. 21.3.1906 in Saarbrücken,
wohnhaft: Saarbrücken, Enkircher Weg 23
Beruf: Versicherungskaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Saarland der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1.6.1933

M A Y, Fritz, geb. 26.10.1914 in Osthofen,
wohnhaft: Osthofen, Mainzer Str. 20
Beruf: Winzer/Weinhändler
Vorsitzender des LV Rheinland-Pfalz der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.3.1933
SS-Sturmbannführer

FASSBENDER, Heinrich, geb. 24.5.1899 in Solingen,
wohnhaft: Rothenburg/Fulda, Oberer Hausberg 4
Beruf: Kaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hessen der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1918 Mitglied der "Deutsch-Nationalen-Volkspartei" (DNVP)
1946 FDP-Mitglied und Mitglied des hessischen Landtages,
1949 Mitglied des Bundestages,
1955 Übertritt zur "Deutschen Partei" (DP) u. Mitglied der Fraktion der DP im Deutschen Bundestag.

NSDAP: 1.10.1931
Austritt erfolgte im November 1932

KÜHNE, Dr. jur. Lothar, geb. 2.1.1908 in Steinbach/Thür.,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Im Moore 12,
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt,
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Niedersachsen der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
FDP-Mitglied u. stellv. Landesvorsitzender

NSDAP: 1.12.1931
1934 Reichssicherheitshauptamt,
1936 Referent in der "Parteiamtlichen Prüfungskommission" im Stab des Stellvertreters des Führers,
1937 Büro des Botschafters von Ribbentrop,
SS-Untersturmführer

LOBER, Karl-Ernst, geb. 6.8.1927 in Namslau/Schl.,
wohnhaft: Schleswig, Kolonnenweg 31,
Beruf: Bäcker und Jugendpfleger

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Schleswig-Holstein der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SRP-Mitglied und Funktionär,
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär auf Kreisebene.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

V. Ämter im Präsidium:

Organisationsabteilung: Adolf v. THADDEN (s.Stellvertreter)

Finanzabteilung: Otto Theodor BROUWER (s.Präsidium)

Rechtsabteilung: Fritz WINKELMANN (s.Präsidium)

Propaganda- u.Schulungsabteilung: Otto HESS (s.Präsidium)

Pressenabteilung: Waldemar SCHÜTZ (s. Präsidium)

Referat z.b.V.: Fritz WINKELMANN (s.Präsidium)

VI. Referenten im Parteivorstand:

Außenpolitik:

von THADDEN, Adolf (s. Stellvertreter)

Innenpolitik:

HERRMANNSDÖRFER, Benno, geb. 20.3.1916 in Altötting,
wohnhaft: München, Heckenstaller Str. 178,
Beruf: Senatsrat

Mitglied des geschäftsführenden Vorstandes des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD,
Vorsitzender des Bezirksverbandes Oberbayern der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1.1.1938
HJ-Mitglied seit 1933

Agrarpolitik:

RUDOLPH, Heinz, geb. 7.6.1922 in Elberberg,
wohnhaft: Klein-Ilde 5,
Beruf: Bürgermeister, Dipl.Landwirt, Hauptmann d.R.

Referent für Agrarfragen im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
Redner auf Landesebene im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
1. Vorsitzender im Kreisverband Hildesheim der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
CDU-Mitglied

NSDAP: 1.9.1940

Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Steuerpolitik:

FASSBENDER, Heinrich (s. Parteivorstand)

Verkehrspolitik:

SCHWEIMER, Horst-Günther (S. Präsidium)

Jugendfragen:

LOBER, Karl-Ernst (s. Parteivorstand)

Sozialpolitik:

KNUPFER, Kurt, geb. 7.6.1915 in Rippien,
wohnhaft: Neuenhaus, Jahnstr. 2,
Beruf: Elektromonteur

Geschäftsführer und Kassenleiter im Kreisverband Grafschaft Bentheim der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.5.1930

Frauen- und Familienfragen:

WINKELVOSS, Gertraud (s. Parteivorstand)

Kulturpolitik:

DEHNEN, Dr. Dietrich, geb. 19.4.1924 in Duisburg,
wohnhaft: Duisburg-Meiderich, Haferacker 13
Beruf: Oberstudienrat

2. stellv. Vorsitzender im LV Nordrhein-Westf. d.NPD
Landesredner des LV Nordrhein-Westfalen der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

Vertriebenenfragen:

GUTMANN, Wilhelm (s. Stellvertreter)

Arbeitskreis Bundeswehr:

NITSCHE, Dieter, geb. 4.7.1934 in Zittau,
wohnhaft: Oldenburg, (z.Z. Putlos)
Beruf: Hauptmann der Bundeswehr

NPD-Stadtrat im Stadtparlament Oldenburg

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
AKON- Mitglied

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

VII. Sonstige Funktionen im Parteivorstand

Leiter der Abteilung Kasse:

SCHÜTZ, Waldemar (s. Präsidium)

Leiter der Revisionsabteilung in der Finanzabteilung:

SCHIMMEROHN, Dr. Heinz, geb. 22.1.1911 in Chemnitz,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Raimundstr. 1
Beruf: Versicherungs-Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.6.1930
SS-Obersturmbannführer

Bundesgeschäftsführer:

SCHWARZ, Martin, geb. 16.9.1912 in Oels/Schles.
wohnhaft: Porz-Ensen, Charlottenstr. 14
Beruf: Hauptmann d.Bw. a.D.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: 1.5.1932

Anlage 2

Gesellschafter des Verlages
"Deutsche Nachrichten" (DN) GmbH.

SCHÜTZ, Waldemar, geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,
wohnhaft: Göttingen, Felix-Klein-Str. 4
Beruf: Schriftleiter und Verlagsinhaber

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.11.1936,
1929 Eintritt in die HJ,
1934 Adjutant des Gau-Pressechefs,
1937 Kreiswart und Gaureferent "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF),
1938 - 1939 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,
anschließend Beauftragter der NSDAP im Gau Hessen,
SS-Hauptsturmführer des Waffen-SS.

von THADDEN, Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,
wohnhaft: Benthe, Lärchenweg 6
Beruf: Chefredakteur

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1949 Mitglied der "Deutschen Rechts-Partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion "Nationale Rechte",
1950 Mitglied und Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),
1955 - 1959 Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages.

NSDAP: 1.9.1939

HESS, Otto, geb. 19.12.1908 in Rossdorf,
wohnhaft: Bissendorf, Weidendamm,
Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann,

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitgl. u. Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP)

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1938 Referent im Berichts- und Rechtsamt der obersten SA-Führung,
SA-Obersturmbannführer.

MAIER - DORN, Emil, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
wohnhaft: Großaitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)
1936 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben
1937 Reichsschulungsleiter im Amt für Technik, München

[illegible], Dr. G[illegible], geb. 24.5.1910 in Berlin,
wohnhaft: Wiesbaden-[illegible]enberg, Tennelba[illegible]str. 23
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.5.1928
Referatsleiter der Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, Berlin

[illegible]SOHN, Dr. Heinz, geb. 22.1.1911 in Chemnitz,
wohnhaft: Hannover, [illegible]str. 1
Beruf: Versicherungskaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär
D[illegible] - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.6.1930
SS-Obersturmbannführer

von [illegible], Prof. Dr. Hans-Bernhard, geb. 30.5.1903 in Protzig/Pommern
wohnhaft: Wuppertal-Vohwinkel, Am Osterholz 55
Beruf: Universitäts-Professor z.Wv.
zur Zeit Lehrer an einer Privatschule

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.2.1931
Gauamtsleiter der NSDAP (Gau Ostpreußen)
Gauheimstätten-Amtsleiter,
Gaustudentenbundführer.
Ordentlicher Professor der Staatswissenschaften
Rektor der Albertus-Universität in Königsberg.

[illegible], Walter, geb. 6.10.1906 in Breslau,
wohnhaft: Hamburg-Altona, Arnoldstr. 24
Beruf: Angestellter

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.4.1932

[illegible]ICHT, Peter, geb. 22.10.1930 in Greifswald,
wohnhaft: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, SPreuergasse 45
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

SEETZEN, Walter, geb. 25.11.1916 in Hamburg,
wohnhaft: Bremen, Kulenkampffallee 162
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SRP - Mitglied und Funktionär
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.4.1936

THIELEN, Friedrich (Fritz), geb. 25.9.1916 in Bremen,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Schönebeck, Brauteichen 19
Beruf: Beton-Fabrikant

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründungsmitglied der CDU,
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften,
1957 Mitglied und später Landesvorsitzender der
"Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

BROUWER, Otto Theodor, geb. 31.5.1906 in Paris,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Vegesack, Gerhard-Rohlfs-Str. 61
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
"Deutsche Partei" (DP)
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften.

NSDAP: 1.8.1931

18 July 1963

GERMANY AFTER THE WAR, A BACKGROUND READING LIST

BOOKS

ABOSCH, HEINZ. The menace of the miracle: Germany from Hitler to Adenauer. London, Collet's, 1962. 277p. DD259.A683 1963 DLC; DD259.AIE5 CIA.

ARNTZ, HELMUT. Germany in a nutshell. 2d ed., rev. and enl. Bonn, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany, 1960. 116p. DD43.A8 1960 DLC.

BENGTSON, JOHN ROBERT. Nazi war aims; the plans for the thousand year Reich. Rock Island, Ill., Augustana College Library, 1962. 155p. (Augustana Library publications, no.30) DD256.5.B37 DLC.

BITHELL, JETHRO, ed. Germany, a companion to German studies. 5th ed., rev. and enl. London, Methuen, 1955. 578p. DD61.B56 1955 DLC; DD61.B6 1955 CIA.

BOSSENBROOK, WILLIAM JOHN. The German mind. Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1961. 469p. DD76.B677 DLC.

BRANT, STEFAN, pseud. East German rising. London, Thames and Hudson, 1955. 202p. DD261.4.B713 DLC; DD261.4.B8E5 CIA.

BULLOCK, ALAN LOUIS CHARLES. Hitler; a study in tyranny. Rev. ed. New York, Harper, 1960. 776p. DD247.H5B85 DLC; DD247.H5B85 1960 CIA.

CLAY, LUCIUS DU BIGNON. Decision in Germany. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1950. 522p. DD257.C55 DLC; DD257.C6 CIA.

COLLIER, DAVID S., and KURT GLASER., eds. Berlin and the future of Eastern Europe. Chicago, Regnery, 1963. 251p. (Foundation for Foreign Affairs series, no.7) DR48.5.C6 DLC; D843.C7 CIA.

CONANT, JAMES BRYANT. Germany and freedom; a personal appraisal. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. 117p. (The Godkin lectures at Harvard University, 1958) DD259.2.C64 DLC; DD259.2C62 CIA.

CROCE, BENEDETTO. Germany and Europe, a spiritual dissension. New York, Random House, 1955. 83p. DD76.C74 DLC.

DAVIDSON, EUGENE. The death and life of Germany; an account of the American occupation. London, J. Cape, 1959. 422p. DD257.D33 DLC; DD257.D33E5 CIA.

DEHIO, LUDWIG. Germany and world politics in the twentieth century. New York, Knopf, 1959. 141p. DD232.D413 DLC; DD232.D5 CIA.

DICKINSON, ROBERT ERIC. Germany; a general and regional geography. 2d ed. London, Methuen; New York, Dutton, 1961. 716p. DD43.D5 DLC; DD43.D5 1961 CIA.

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DILL, MARSHALL. Germany; a modern history. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1961. 467p. DD89.D5 DLC; DD89.D5 CIA.

DONNER, JOERN. Report from Berlin. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961. 284p. DD881.D633 DLC; DD881.D62 CIA.

Translation from the Swedish.

DORNBERG, JOHN. Schizophrenic Germany. New York, Macmillan, 1961. 302p. DD259.2.D6 DLC; DD259.2.D6 CIA.

DULLES, ALLEN WELSH. Germany's underground. New York, Macmillan, 1947. 207p. DD256.D8 DLC; Y1838.D8 CIA.

A simple, clear account of the opposition to Hitler during the war.

EPSTEIN, FRITZ THEODOR. Germany and the United States: basic patterns of conflict and understanding. Lawrence, Kansas, 1959. 284-314p. E183.8.G3E6 DLC.

"Reprinted from Issues and Conflicts, University of Kansas Press, 374p. 1959."

ERHARD, LUDWIG. Prosperity through competition. New York, Praeger, 1958. 260p. HC286.5.E7313 DLC.

EYCK, ERICH. A history of the Weimar Republic. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962- DD237.E913 DLC.

FLENLEY, Ralph Modern German History (1953)

FREUND, GERALD. Germany between two worlds. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1961. 296p. DD259.4.F78 CIA.

GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC) CONSTITUTION, 1961. The basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany; amendments as of 31 December 1961. New York, German Information Center, 1961. 62p. JN3971.A3A5 1961 CIA.

GOERLITZ, WALTER. History of the German general staff, 1657-1945. New York, Praeger, 1953. 508p. DD101.G614 1953 DLC; DD101.G61 1953E5 CIA.

GOLAY, John The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (1958)

GOTTLIEB, MANUEL. The German peace settlement and the Berlin crisis. New York, Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1960. 275p. DD257.G68 DLC; DD257.G68 CIA.

GT. BRIT. FOREIGN OFFICE. Selected documents on Germany and the question of Berlin, 1944-1961. London, HMSO, 1961. 483p. (Its Germany, 1961, no.2. Gt. Brit. Parliament. Papers by command, cmnd. 1552) DD257.4.G75 1961 DLC.

GROSSER, ALFRED. The colossus again; Western Germany from defeat to rearmament. New York, Praeger, 1955. 249p. DD257.G7413 DLC; DD257.G7E5 CIA.

HEIDENHEIMER, ARNOLD J. The governments of Germany. New York, Crowell, 1961. 224p. JN3971.A58H4 DLC; JN3971.A58H4 CIA.

HELLER, DEANE, and DAVID HELLER. The Berlin Wall. New York, Walker, 1962. 242p. DD881.H39 DLC; DD881.H42 CIA.

HERTZ, FRIEDRICH OTTO. Development of the German public mind; a social history of German political sentiments, aspirations, and ideas. London, Allen & Unwin, 1957. 524p. DD112.H44 DLC.

HEYDECKER, JOE JULIUS, and JOHANNES LEEB. The Nuremberg trial; a history of Nazi Germany. New York, World Pub. Co., 1962. 398p. KI836.1.G3H6lb5 CIA.

HISCOCKS, RICHARD. Democracy in Western Germany. London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1957. 324p. DD259.4.H5 DLC; DD259.4.H6 CIA.

HOETTL, WILHELM. The secret front; the story of Nazi political espionage. New York, Praeger, 1954. 327p. DD256.5.H563 DLC; Y1832.5.H69E5 CIA.

Translation from the German.

HOLBORN, HAJO. A history of modern Germany. New York, A. Knopf, 1959- DD175.H62 DLC.

v.1: The Reformation.

HOLBROOK, SABRA. Capital without a country: The challenge of Berlin. New York, Coward-McCann, 1961.

HORNE, ALISTAIR. Return to power; a report on the new Germany. New York, Praeger, 1956. 415p. DD259.4.H65 1956 DLC; DD259.4.H8 1956 CIA.

HUEBENER, THEODORE. The schools of West Germany; a study of German elementary and secondary schools. New York, New York University Press, 1962. 181p. LA721.82.H8 DLC; LA721.82.H8 CIA.

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES. The Third Reich; a study published under the auspices of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies and with the assistance of UNESCO. New York, Praeger, 1955. 910p. DD256.5.I58 1955a DLC; DD256.5.I5 CIA.

JARMAN, THOMAS LECKIE. The rise and fall of Nazi Germany. New York, New York University Press, 1956. 388p. DD256.5.J3 1956 DLC; DD256.5.J3 CIA.

JOHNSON, UWE. Speculations about Jakob. New York, Grove, 1962.

A novel reflecting life during the last decades in Germany.

KITZINGER, UWE W. German electoral politics, a study of the 1957 campaign. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960. 365p. JN3971.A95K5 DLC; JN3971.A956 1957.K7 CIA.

KOCHAN, LIONEL. The struggle for Germany, 1914-1945. Edinburgh, University Press; Chicago, Aldine Pub. Co., 1963. 150p. DD240.K57 DLC; D443.K7 CIA.

KOHN, HANS. The mind of Germany; the education of a nation. New York, Scribner, 1960. 370p. DD76.K59 DLC; DD76.K59 CIA.

KRIEGER, LEONARD. The German idea of freedom; history of a political tradition. Boston, Beacon Press, 1957. 540p. DD112.K82 DLC.

LAQUEUR, WALTER ZE'EV. Young Germany; a history of the German youth movement. London, Routledge & Paul, 1962. 253p. HM19.L3 DLC; HQ799.G5L3 CIA.

LIDDELL HART, BASIL HENRY. The German generals talk. New York, Morrow, 1948. 308p. D757.L5 1948a DLC; D757.L5 CIA.

LOEWENSTEIN, Prince HUBERTUS, and VOLKMAR VON ZUEHLSDORFF. NATO and the defense of the West. New York, Praeger, 1962. 383p. UA646.3.L8E5 CIA.

LOWIE, ROBERT HARRY. Toward understanding Germany. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954. 396p. HN445.L68 DLC; HN445.L6 CIA.

MCINNIS, EDGAR, RICHARD HISCOCKS, and ROBERT SPENCER. The shaping of postwar Germany. London, Dent, 1960. 195p. DD257.M35 1960a DLC; DD257.M35 1960 CIA.

MCCLELLAN, GRANT S., ed. The two Germanies. New York, Wilson, 1959. 184p. (The Reference shelf, v.31, no.1) DD257.M27 DLC; DD257.M2 CIA.

MANDER, JOHN. Berlin, hostage for the West. Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1962. 124p. (A Penguin special, S209) DD881.M27 DLC; DD881.M2 CIA.

MANVELL, ROGER, and HEINRICH FRAENKEL. Goering. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1962. 442p. DD247.G67M3 DLC; DD247.G67M2 CIA.

MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH. The German catastrophe; reflections and recollections. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. 121p. DD256.5.M42 DLC; DD256.5.M4E5 CIA.

Translation from the German.

MERKATZ, HANS JOACHIM VON, and WOLFGANG METZNER, eds. Germany today: facts and figures. Frankfurt a.M., A. Metzner, 1954. 413p. DD259.M372 DLC; DD259.M372 CIA.

METCALF, JOHN C. Our stake in Germany. Washington, Washington College Press, 1961. 96p. DD259.2.M42 DLC.

NEAL, FRED WARNER. War and peace and Germany. New York, W. W. Norton, 1962. 166p. DD257.25.N38 DLC; DD257.25.N3 CIA.

NESSELRODE, FRANZ VON. Germany's other half; a journalist's appraisal of East Germany. London, New York, Abelard-Schuman, 1963. 207p. DD261.N45 DLC; DD261.2.N4 CIA.

PASSANT, ERNEST JAMES. Short history of Germany 1815-1945. London, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1959. 255p. DD232.P35 DLC; DS; DD232.P2 CIA.

PINNEY, EDWARD L. Federalism, bureaucracy and party politics in Western Germany. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1963. 268p. JN3971.A77P5 DLC.

PINSON, KOPPEL SHUB. Modern Germany, its history and civilization. New York, Macmillan, 1954. 637p. DD203.P5 1944 DLC; DD203.P5 1954 CIA. *

A useful survey, particularly of the intellectual background.

PLISCHKE, ELMER. Contemporary government of Germany. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961. 248p. JN3971.A5P55 DLC; JN3971.A5P7 CIA.

POLLOCK, JAMES KERR, and others. Germany in power and eclipse; the background of German development. New York, Van Nostrand, 1952. 661p. DD89.P64 DLC; DD89.P6 CIA.

POUNDS, NORMAN JOHN GREVILLE. Divided Germany and Berlin. Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1962. 128p. DD257.25.P6 DLC; DD257.25.P7 CIA.

PRITTIE, Hon. TERENCE CORNELIUS FARMER. Germany divided. Boston, Little, Brown, 1960. 380p. DD257.P72 1961 DLC; DD257.P7 CIA.

DLC has English ed.

REINHARDT, KURT FRANK. Germany: 2000 years. Rev. ed. New York, F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1961. 2v. DD89.R36 1961 DLC; DD89.R36 1961 CIA.

ROBSON, CHARLES B., ed. Berlin--pivot of German destiny. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1960. 233p. DD881.B4553 DLC; DD881.R62 CIA.

ROTHFELS, HANS. The German opposition to Hitler, an appraisal. 2d rev. ed. Chicago, Regnery, 1962. 166p. (Foundation for foreign affairs series, no.6) DD256.3.R6 1962 DLC; Y1838.R84 1962 CIA.

SHIRER, WILLIAM LAWRENCE. The rise and fall of the Third Reich; a history of Nazi Germany. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960. 1245p. DD256.5.S48 DLC; DD256.5.S55 CIA.

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SMITH, BRUCE LANNES R. The governance of Berlin. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1959. 171-230p. (International conciliation, no.525) JX1907.A8 no.525 DLC.

SNYDER, LOUIS LEO. Basic history of modern Germany. Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1957. 192p. DD175.S58 DLC; DD175.S58 CIA.

SPEIER, HANS. German rearmament and atomic war; the views of German military and political leaders. Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1957. 272p. UA710.S56 DLC; UA710.S7 CIA.

SPEIER, HANS, and W. PHILLIPS DAVISON, eds. West German leadership and foreign policy. Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1957. 323p. DD259.4.S6 DLC; DD259.4S7 CIA.

STAHL, WALTER, ed. The politics of postwar Germany. New York, Praeger for Atlantic-Bruecke, 1963. 480p. DD259.4.S8 DLC; DD259.4.S71 CIA.

STERN, FRITZ RICHARD. Cultural despair and the politics of discontent; a study of the rise of the "Germanic" ideology. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961. 367p. DD76.S72 1961 DLC.

STOLPER, WOLFGANG F. The structure of the East German economy. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960. 478p. HC287.A2S7 DLC; HC287.A2S7 CIA.

TAYLOR, ALAN JOHN PERCIVALE. The course of German history; a survey of the development of Germany since 1815. New York, Coward-McCann, 1946. 230p. DD203.T3 1946 DLC.

TETENS, TETE HARENS. The new Germany and the old Nazis. New York, Random House, 1961. 286p. DD259.2.T4 DLC; DD259.2.T3 CIA.

THAYER, CHARLES WHEELER. The unquiet Germans. New York, Harper, 1957. 275p. DD257.T45 DLC.

VERMEIL, EDMOND. Germany in the twentieth century; a political and cultural history of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. New York, Praeger, 1956. 288p. DD232.V413 1956 DLC; DD232.V5E5 CIA.

VIERECK, PETER ROBERT EDWIN. Metapolitics, the roots of the Nazi mind. New York, Capricorn Books, 1961. 364p. (A Capricorn book, CAP45) DD253.V5 1961 DLC.

WHEELER-BENNETT, JOHN WHEELER. The nemesis of power. London, New York, Macmillan, 1953. 829p. DD240.W5 DLC; DD240.W56 CIA.

Revised ed. 1963

WOHLRABE, RAYMOND A., and WERNER KRUSCH. The land and people of Germany. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1957. 118p. DD17.W6 DLC.